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Milan and the future of global governance of artificial intelligence

The functions of a new UN pillar for AI governance

Updated edition as of 30 October 2026, after the 81st United Nations General Assembly. Follows the series launched on 27 July 2026 with the document *Milan and the future of global governance of artificial intelligence. Why Milan should bid to host a UN Hub for the ethical governance of AI.*



AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN ITALY

Confcommercio
Milano Lodi Monza Brianza

ASSOLOMBARDA

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Foreword

> On 27 July 2026 AmCham Italy published a policy paper devoted to a precise question, why Milan could put itself forward to host a United Nations Hub for the ethical governance of artificial intelligence.[5] That document opened a debate which in the following weeks produced concrete results, a cross-party promoting committee, the support of economic, academic and parliamentary institutions, and a public discussion that went beyond the borders of our country.

Since then the question we are asked has changed. Our interlocutors, Italian and foreign, no longer ask whether Milan is a suitable seat. They ask what this structure should do, with which functions, which tools, within which limits and in what relationship with the organizations already working in the multilateral system. It is a demanding question, and it is the right one. This second paper tries to answer it.

The answer comes at a particular moment. During the high-level week of the 81st General Assembly in New York, the governance of artificial intelligence became for the first time a leading issue for Heads of State and Government. The President of the United States rejected “any attempt to build a globalist scheme” to control it.[40] The day before, twenty-two leaders, who had become 33 leaders from 31 countries by 23 October, had called for consideration of an international institution able to set standards, enable verification and convene States when system capabilities exceed critical thresholds.[43] At the Security Council, Sam Altman and Dario Amodei asked for common standards, verification systems and fast channels for incident reporting.[46, 48]

At first sight these positions are far apart. On a careful reading, they leave open the same space, that of a seat which does not regulate, authorise or sanction, but makes available to all shared methods, comparable measures, timely reports to the Scientific Panel and technical capacity. This is the space that this document proposes to entrust to a new United Nations pillar, and that Milan can host. Measuring does not mean prohibiting. It means making every subsequent choice possible, including the choice not to regulate.

This updated edition takes account of what has happened since September. The United Nations architecture for artificial intelligence now exists, with the Scientific Panel, the Global Dialogue and its co-chairs for 2027, and the Valencia laboratory. What is missing is an international home for the methods of independent evaluation, with shared criteria and open to all States. Milan proposes to be that home, as a new generation pillar that connects with what already works and duplicates nothing.

The heart of the document is twelve functions, four of which form the distinctive core of the first year. They are not an invention. They translate into operational tasks the principles of the UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, adopted in 2021 by all Member States, within the framework opened by Resolution A/RES/79/325. They are ordered by a single criterion, technology must remain at the service of the person.

A bid is sustained by the quality of what it proposes, not by the insistence with which it is presented. Milan can offer the United Nations a place; Italy, together with the place, a clear institutional project; Europe, the legal framework in which that project acquires universal meaning. These pages are our contribution to that project and an invitation to discuss it on its merits.

Managing Director



Simone Crolla

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Executive Summary

> The international community no longer debates whether permanent institutions for artificial intelligence are needed. It debates what they should do and, above all, what they should not do. This paper, which follows the AmCham document of 27 July 2026, answers with twelve functions for a new United Nations pillar, four of which are distinctive from the first year, and proposes Milan as its seat.[1, 5]

The twelve functions of the pillar. The heart of the proposal, developed in chapter 5, is a set of twelve technical functions. The functions translate into operational tasks the principles of the 2021 UNESCO Recommendation and are ordered by a single criterion, technology at the service of the person. Each has a declared limit and a result indicator. The distinctive core of the first year is independent evaluation, with four functions, evaluation methods and measures (5.1), ethics and rights in evaluation (5.2 and 5.3), evaluation capacity (5.9 and 5.10) and technical support to the Panel and the Dialogue. The other functions are exercised in coordination with the organization that holds the mandate and retains ownership of it.[10]

THE TWELVE FUNCTIONS AT A GLANCE

5.1 CORE **Evaluation methods and measures** A public library of comparable testing protocols and a measure of the pace of the frontier.	5.2 CORE **Ethical impact assessment** UNESCO tools built into testing protocols, with comparable results.	5.3 CORE **Human accountability** Whoever answers for a decision always remains identifiable along the technology chain.
5.4 IN COORDINATION **Transparency and provenance** Robustness tests on authenticity and provenance. Standards remain with ISO, IEC and ITU.	5.5 IN COORDINATION **Data and documentation** Documenting the data on which a system was trained and on what legal basis.	5.6 IN COORDINATION **Equity among countries** A comparable index of gaps in compute, data and skills, in order to reduce them.
5.7 IN COORDINATION **Work and transition** Comparable data on employment effects and on the policies that work.	5.8 IN COORDINATION **Health and minors** Comparable evidence and precautionary criteria for the most vulnerable people.	5.9 CORE **Evaluation capacity** Evaluators and regulators trained in countries that do not have their own institute.
5.10 CORE **Languages and pluralism** Evaluation tests in many languages and protection of excluded cultures.	5.11 IN COORDINATION **Environment and compute** Making the energy, water and land footprint of data centres comparable.	5.12 IN COORDINATION **Safety and stability** Building on the common OECD framework for incident reporting.

Four products methods, measures, reports, capacity · **No power** to regulate, authorise, certify or convene

The political framework asks for less regulation. On 2 September 2026 the G20 Innovation Ministerial in Chapel Hill adopted by consensus the Carolina Principles, a sectoral and proportionate approach, priority to existing regulatory frameworks, no new general-purpose architecture.[2] The United States line is the clearest. The AI Action Plan aims to accelerate innovation and remove regulatory burdens; on 19 September the President announced an "AI Force"; on 22 September, at the General Assembly, he declared that the United States "totally rejects" any globalist scheme of control and proposed to call the technology "superintelligence".[23, 24, 38, 40]

The technical and multilateral framework asks for more coordination. The Pacing the Frontier appeal, signed by 1,386 employees of frontier laboratories, and Dario Amodei's essay of 12 September call for international tools to govern the pace of development.[4, 19] On 21 September twenty-two leaders, who had become 33 leaders from 31 countries by 23 October, including the heads of government of Canada, Germany, Spain and Australia and the President of the European Commission, invited Member States to consider an international institution "able to set standards, enable verification and convene States when capability thresholds are exceeded".[43] On 23 September, at the Security Council, Sam Altman called for common standards to measure capabilities and assess risks, fast incident reporting protocols and secure channels between governments; Amodei proposed targeted global agreements, mutual verification systems and common testing standards.[46, 48]

The two lines meet in a precise space. Washington rejects a global regulatory regime but, through White House science adviser Michael Kratsios, acknowledges that "you cannot govern a technology you do not understand" and asks the United Nations to help States build national capacity.[50]

This is exactly what the proposed pillar would do, produce methods, measures, reports and capacity, without any power to regulate, authorise, sanction, certify or convene. The pillar does not set standards, which remain with ISO, IEC and ITU, it does not replace the European AI Office or national authorities, in Italy AgID and ACN, and it leaves scientific assessment to the Panel.

Structure, funding and timing. A light secretariat and a technical support unit serving the Scientific Panel and the Global Dialogue, at the request of the UN Office for Digital and Emerging Technologies, on the model of the IPCC technical support units. Funding follows Resolution A/RES/79/325, which operates within existing resources. The host country provides the premises and the technical unit, States contribute on a voluntary basis to the Secretariat of the Panel and the Dialogue, and companies take part through a fund with caps on individual contributions and separation from evaluation activities. Mandatory contributions would be possible only after a decision of the General Assembly. In the first year the four distinctive functions operate; from twelve to thirty-six months comes consolidation; beyond thirty-six months the functions that require scale.[58, 76]

Why Milan, Italy and Europe. Milan concentrates universities, clinical research, industry and finance within the same urban radius and is among the first European cities with its own public framework of principles on AI.[32, 33] Italy is the third UN hub after New York and Geneva, led the AI dossier during its 2024 G7 presidency and is the first EU Member State with a comprehensive national law on the subject.[28, 31, 37] Europe is a third seat with respect to the competition between the United States and China and has the only legal order with horizontal rules already in force.[29, 30]

The recommendation. Italy should come to the second session of the Global Dialogue, in New York on 3 and 4 May 2027, with a proposal of functions and not only of a seat, and arrive prepared for the review of the Global Digital Compact that opens in September 2027. Three acts are proposed to the Government over the next six months. Leadership, with a national dossier in the Coordination Committee provided for by article 19 of Law no. 132 of 2025. Resources, with a voluntary contribution to the Secretariat of the Panel and the Dialogue and the offer of a technical support unit and premises in Milan. Presence, with a

national evaluation capacity built with AgID, ACN and universities and entry into the international network of evaluation institutes. Parliament is asked for a bipartisan motion and explicit support in the 2027 budget law.[28, 72]

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CHAPTER 01

From place to functions

> The policy paper of 27 July 2026 argued a thesis of location, that in the multilateral architecture now taking shape there is an institutional space not yet occupied, and that Milan has the credentials to put itself forward as the seat of a future UN-mandated structure dedicated to the ethical governance of artificial intelligence.[5] That thesis opened the debate, but left the next question unanswered, what exactly this structure should do.

This is not a secondary question. In multilateral practice the choice of seat follows the definition of the mandate, it does not precede it. A bid that offered only a building, however prestigious, would be read as a logistical proposal. A bid that accompanies the seat with an orderly and verifiable description of functions enters instead into the substance of the negotiation and helps to steer it. It is the difference between asking to host an institution and proposing what that institution can do for the international community.

1.1 Nature of the document

The document starts from established institutional facts, derives from them a mandate compatible with the orientations of the main technology economies, translates into operational functions the ethical principles already shared at universal level and indicates the tools with which to exercise them. It is neither a draft treaty nor a draft resolution. It is a technical contribution, offered by an organization of economic civil society to the States that will bear responsibility for the decisions.

The paper does not presuppose the creation of a new specialised agency, a decision that has not been taken in any formal forum, nor does it presuppose a seat selection procedure, which does not exist in codified form. The functions, the rules of method and the implementation sequence are AmCham Italy's own elaboration. The normative, scientific and magisterial texts cited indicate the anchoring of the criteria adopted and do not imply that the institutions that produced them endorse a specific institutional architecture.

1.2 Why Milan

A seat is not judged by its beauty, but by the density of interlocutors it makes available to the institution it hosts. From this point of view Milan brings together four features that are hard to find together elsewhere in Italy.

The first is a concentration of knowledge covering the whole range of the twelve functions. In the same metropolitan area operate the Politecnico, the University of Milan, the Università Cattolica, Bocconi, Bicocca, IULM and Humanitas University, together with research centres on data and the life sciences and major clinical institutes of national importance. Since 2021 Milan has been the main Italian unit of ELLIS, the European network of centres of excellence in machine learning, and it takes part in national research programmes on artificial intelligence.[33, 34] For functions such as impact assessment, health or the training of regulators, having these interlocutors a few kilometres away is the condition for producing methods and measures in times compatible with those of technology.

The second is an administration that has already chosen to engage with the problem. With the Manifesto for the use of artificial intelligence, the City set transparency, accountability, inclusion, protection of rights and the centrality of the person as criteria for administrative action, and accompanied them with a mapping of the use cases already active in city services, an urban digital twin and programmes dedicated to person-centred solutions.[32] The pillar's functions would not arrive in Milan as an abstract exercise. They would find an administration that already needs them.

The third is an economic base that makes the issue immediately concrete. Milan is the country's financial centre and the gateway for most foreign investment in Italy; Lombardy produces about one fifth of national gross domestic product and records the highest research and development spending among Italian regions.[35, 36] An institution that produces methods and measures for business, work, health and infrastructure needs a productive fabric on which to test them before proposing them to the world.

The fourth is an international vocation already exercised. The city has hosted negotiations, summits and major events, most recently the 2026 Winter Olympic Games. The bid, moreover, is not an isolated initiative. It rests on a promoting committee that brings together local institutions, universities, companies and their associations, professional bodies, the financial system and parliamentarians of different political orientations.[16]

1.3 Why Italy

The seat is a city, but the bid belongs to a State. The Italian reasons are three.

Italy is already a host country of the United Nations system. Rome is the seat of FAO, the World Food Programme and IFAD; Brindisi hosts, together with Valencia, the twin bases of the United Nations Global Service Centre; Turin hosts the United Nations System Staff College. Rome also hosts the AI Hub for Sustainable Development and, following the agreement of September 2026 between the Foreign Minister and the UNDP Administrator, will host headquarters functions of the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF). Taken together, these presences make Italy the third UN hub in the world after New York and Geneva.[31, 64, 73, 78] There are therefore established practices of headquarters agreements, an administration that knows them and a community of international civil servants already settled in the country.

Italy has already brought this issue to the highest level. During the 2024 G7 presidency artificial intelligence was a cross-cutting dossier. The Borgo Egnazia Summit devoted a specific session to it, the only one in the history of the G7 attended by a Pope, and the Italian presidency completed the monitoring mechanism of the International Code of Conduct for advanced systems, in continuity with the Hiroshima Process.[14, 37]

Finally, Italy is the first Member State of the European Union to have a comprehensive national law on artificial intelligence. Law no. 132 of 23 September 2025 complements the European regulation with provisions on health, work, public administration, justice, copyright and the protection of minors, and designates AgID and ACN as the competent national authorities; article 19 establishes a Coordination Committee chaired by the President of the Council of Ministers or the delegated Authority.[28, 72] For the bid the point is one of method. Italy can document through its own experience the problem the pillar intends to solve, namely the cost of applying shared principles in the absence of comparable methods.

To these reasons is added proximity to the Holy See, which in recent years has produced the most articulated public corpus on the ethical dimension of artificial intelligence, recalled in chapter 4 and taken up in September 2026 by the AI and Human Development roundtable convened by the Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations at the Pontifical Gregorian University.[8]

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1.4 Why Europe

The third question is the most political. In 2026 the competition on artificial intelligence is played out between the United States and China, and Europe is often described as the continent that regulates what others build. Precisely for this reason a European seat makes sense, for three reasons.

In Europe principles already have legal form. The Union is the only legal order with horizontal rules on artificial intelligence in progressive application; the Council of Europe opened for signature in Vilnius, on 5 September 2024, the Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, the first binding international treaty on the subject, open also to non-European States.[29, 30] A pillar that produces methods on the rights of the person finds here a legal order on which to test at once the practicability of its proposals.

A European seat is a third-party seat. The pillar must offer a common grammar to countries that compete with one another. Placed in one of the two poles of the competition, it would be read by the other as a partisan instrument. It is the same reason why, in other sectors, from nuclear energy to health and telecommunications, international technical verification has been placed in countries that were not protagonists of the contest. The September debate at the Security Council, in which Washington and Beijing restated distant positions, confirms it.[47]

Finally, Europe needs this function more than others. It depends to a large extent on models, compute and infrastructure developed elsewhere. A seat that measures the pace of the frontier, documents the language coverage of systems, makes the environmental footprint of data centres comparable and trains regulators is of direct interest to Europe. It would not overlap with any existing seat. Geneva hosts the technical and human rights dimension, Paris the ethical dimension of UNESCO, Valencia, with the laboratory inaugurated on 28 May 2026, interoperability between governance frameworks, and New York the political level. What is missing is an international home for the methods of independent evaluation, where the ethical dimension is exercised as a permanent technical capacity.[62]

Milan

offers the scientific, economic and institutional interlocutors that the functions require.

Italy

offers its experience as a host country and the credibility of having already brought the issue to multilateral tables.

Europe

offers the legal framework in which “technology at the service of the person” is already law in force.

None of the three levels, on its own, sustains the bid. Together they make it a project.

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CHAPTER 02

Summer 2026, what has changed

> Between the publication of the first paper and the end of October the international picture moved on four levels, which are worth keeping distinct because they respond to different logics, the G20, United States policy, the demand coming from frontier laboratories and the United Nations process. A final section shows who already does what in the international architecture. The high-level week of the General Assembly, which brought these levels together, is dealt with separately in chapter 3.

2.1 The G20 and the Carolina Principles

On 2 September 2026 the G20 Innovation Ministerial, meeting in Chapel Hill, adopted by consensus the Carolina Principles for Emerging Technologies, with the endorsement of China as well.[2] The document asks that the principles be applied flexibly, respecting national legal systems and circumstances, preserving the sovereignty of each member while allowing participation in international discussions.[6] The political criterion was set out clearly, apply existing rules first, introduce new ones only where technology creates genuinely new situations, and avoid treating every innovation as a policy problem.[3]

For a proposal like this one the G20 orientation is not an obstacle, but a design specification. It requires building a structure that does not produce general-purpose rules and that demonstrates, function by function, that it does not duplicate existing competences.

2.2 The United States line

The position expressed at the G20 translates to the multilateral level a declared national strategy. The Administration's AI Action Plan, presented as the strategy to "win the AI race", rests on three pillars, accelerating innovation, building infrastructure, and leading in international diplomacy and security.[23] The first includes removing regulatory burdens, supporting open models and building an "evaluations ecosystem"; the second energy, semiconductors, data centres and a federal incident response capability; the third the export of American technology and standards, countering Chinese influence in international bodies and the "global alignment of protection measures".

Two observations are necessary. The first is that the plan, as a whole, is a programme of competitive acceleration and not of multilateral construction. The second is that three of its objectives, the evaluations ecosystem, incident response and the global alignment of protection measures, cannot be achieved by a single State. An evaluation system that stops at the national border does not make results comparable; incident response without a shared classification does not recognise the same event in two jurisdictions; a global alignment presupposes, by definition, a place in which to align.

In September the line became sharper. On the 19th the President announced an "AI Force", on the model of the Space Force, and the appointment of a national coordinator, ruling out any move to "hinder or stifle" the growth of the sector.[24] In the preceding days he had opened a public consultation on the possibility of replacing the expression "artificial intelligence", considered imprecise.[25] On 20 September Ambassador to the UN Mike Waltz described the competition with China as "far more complex" than the Cold War, because of the degree of economic interdependence, ruled out any brake on innovators and indicated three matters on which a summit between the two Presidents could

establish bilateral safeguards, the spread of algorithms, nuclear weapons systems and human oversight in chains of command.[26, 27] These three matters correspond to precise functions of this paper (5.1, 5.3 and 5.12), because safeguards of this kind, to be verifiable, require common definitions, thresholds and formats.

2.3 The demand coming from the laboratories

In the week of the G20 industry too showed diverging positions. Alongside the call for light regulation, the head of Google DeepMind invited governments to equip themselves with public capacity to test the safety of systems, which presupposes some form of shared verification.[3]

The most explicit signal had come at the end of July. The Pacing the Frontier appeal, published on 28 July 2026, starts from an observation. The leading companies believe they are close to automating AI research itself, with the risk that capabilities grow faster than the ability to understand and control them. Since no company and no country can slow down alone under competitive pressure, the signatories ask the United States government to support an international effort to build the technical and governance tools that are missing today. The appeal was signed by 1,386 employees of frontier laboratories.[4]

On 12 September the demand became a proposal. In the essay We Must Pace the Frontier, Dario Amodei argues that risk prevention alone is no longer enough and that the speed at which model capabilities advance must be modulated; he makes clear that this is not about stopping research, but about guaranteeing the time needed to make systems safe and to have this confirmed by third-party evaluators.[19] The text recalls a documented episode. In July 2026, during internal cybersecurity evaluations conducted by OpenAI, experimental agents circumvented the controls meant to isolate them from the internet, communicated through unauthorised channels and reached third-party systems, including the Hugging Face infrastructure.[20, 44] The proposed plan has three steps, external evaluators with continuous access and the right to publish their conclusions; coordination among companies on common safety standards; and global coordination, which in its most ambitious forms provides for pre-release testing of models entrusted to a global standards body. The head of OpenAI shared on the same day the need to pace the frontier; the heads of xAI and Google DeepMind expressed support for the general direction of the proposal.[21]

Two of the three steps are international by definition, and none requires a new regulatory power. They require a shared method, comparable measures and technical venues for verification.

2.4 The United Nations process

Resolution A/RES/79/325 launched the construction of the permanent architecture, and today that architecture exists. The Independent International Scientific Panel, forty members co-chaired by Yoshua Bengio and Maria Ressa, presented its preliminary report on 1 July 2026. The first session of the Global Dialogue on AI Governance was held in Geneva on 6 and 7 July; the second will be held in New York on 3 and 4 May 2027. On 16 October the President of the General Assembly appointed Saint Kitts and Nevis and the Republic of Korea as co-chairs of the 2027 Dialogue; the secretariat is provided by ITU, UNESCO, the Office for Digital and Emerging Technologies (ODET) and the Executive Office of the Secretary-General. The Dialogue meets under the General Assembly, which decides on its convening.[1, 57, 59, 60] The UN80 initiative, launched by the Secretary-General in March 2025, has meanwhile opened a phase of streamlining of the whole system, with a 21 per cent reduction in posts in 2026 and a proposed programme budget for 2027 that falls further.[7, 75, 76]

Around this core a network of technical instruments has formed in a few months. The AI Governance for Humanity Lab, inaugurated in Valencia on 28 May 2026 with the support of the Spanish Government, which in 2025 allocated 3 million to the initiatives, works on interoperability between governance frameworks; Valencia and Brindisi are the twin bases of the United Nations Global Service Centre.[62, 63, 64] The international network of institutes for the measurement and evaluation of advanced AI, some ten national institutes coordinated in 2026 by the United Kingdom, which includes the European Union AI Office, compares testing practices; Italy is not yet a member.[65] In February 2025 the OECD defined a common framework for incident reporting, built on 29 criteria, which feeds the AIM monitor.[66] UNESCO applies its readiness assessment methodology in more than seventy countries and has developed an ethical impact assessment tool.[67, 68]

Within the same horizon falls the AI and Human Development roundtable at the Pontifical Gregorian University on 4 and 5 September, whose results will feed the work of the Panel and the Global Dialogue.[8] Public debate too has shifted to institutions. In an essay published on 26 August, Bill Gates names as a priority a national and international institutional framework to be built before a crisis forces governments to improvise, proposes an international organization inspired by nuclear inspection regimes, civil aviation rules and the ozone agreements, and recalls the encyclical of Leo XIV on artificial intelligence.[9]

2.5 Who already does what

The picture is richer than a year ago. To position the pillar one must state precisely what the existing seats do and how Milan relates to each of them.

Seat or network	What it does	Relationship with the pillar
UN Scientific Panel	Scientific assessment of the state of knowledge	Receives the pillar's reports and may request its technical support
Global Dialogue, General Assembly	Political forum, convened by the General Assembly; 2027 co-chairs appointed on 16 October	Technical support and contributions to its work, no convening role
AI Governance for Humanity Lab, Valencia	Interoperability between governance frameworks	Complementary, Milan works on methods for evaluating systems
Network of measurement and evaluation institutes	Comparison of the practices of national institutes	Coordination, with protocols open also to countries without an institute
OECD	Common framework for incident reporting, AIM monitor	The pillar builds on this framework, without new taxonomies
UNESCO	2021 Recommendation, readiness assessment, ethical impact assessment	Integration into testing protocols, Milan ensures comparability
ISO, IEC, ITU	Technical standards	Standards remain with them, the pillar offers robustness tests
Global AI Hub, Republic of Korea	Multilateral cooperation centre with UN agencies and development banks, opening planned for 2027	Interlocutor for training and developing countries
AI Hub in Rome, UNDP and UNCDF	Artificial intelligence for sustainable development	Partner for evaluation capacity

Seat or network	What it does	Relationship with the pillar
World AI Cooperation Organization, Shanghai	Intergovernmental organization outside the UN system	No overlap, the pillar operates within the United Nations

The remaining gap is circumscribed. None of these seats offers all States an international home for the methods of independent evaluation, with shared criteria for the quality of evaluation and open also to countries that do not have their own institute. This is the gap the pillar proposes to fill, connecting with what already works and duplicating nothing.[18, 65, 66, 69, 71]

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CHAPTER 03

New York, September 2026

> The high-level week of the 81st General Assembly gave the governance of artificial intelligence a prominence it had never had before. In four days it was addressed by the President of the United States, the Secretary-General, the leaders who signed a joint appeal, the Security Council and the summit between Presidents Trump and Xi. The positions that emerged are far apart, but not for that reason irreconcilable.

3.1 President Trump's speech

On 22 September, from the rostrum of the General Assembly, President Trump devoted to artificial intelligence one of the sharpest passages of his speech. He declared that the United States "totally rejects any attempt to build a globalist scheme to control artificial intelligence" and announced that from then on United States government documents would use the term "superintelligence", because the word "artificial", he said, "makes it sound fake, and it's not fake. It's extraordinary. But we have to be careful".[40, 41]

The President then reiterated that the Administration intends to encourage the development of the sector, not slow it down, because it does not intend to "stifle the growth of something that will be bigger than the industrial revolution", and added, "Whoever wins superintelligence wins. And we are ahead of China, by a lot".[38, 41] He compared warnings about extreme risks to those about climate, arguing that the ordinary tools of law enforcement would be enough, if necessary, to contain the excesses of the sector.[38,39]

The speech confirms, at the highest level, the line described in chapter 2. For the purposes of this proposal, the relevant point is the object of the rejection, a global scheme of control. The pillar described here does not control, authorise or sanction; and the President himself acknowledged that "we have to be careful". Recognising the need for caution without delegating it to a global regulator means, in practice, needing tools to know when and where to be careful.

3.2 The Secretary-General and the appeal of 21 September

On the same day António Guterres, in his last address to the Assembly before the end of his term, pointed in a direction opposite in tone but precise in content. "Children must never become guinea pigs for unregulated systems", he said, and "decisions over life and death must never be delegated to machines"; and again, "the danger is not technology, it is technology without accountability".[40, 41] He asked States to create the conditions for a responsible pace of development and to work towards a multilateral risk management framework, "backed by credible and independent oversight".[42]

The day before, on 21 September, twenty-two leaders led by Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre had signed A Call for Control of Frontier AI Models. The signatories include the heads of government of Canada, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Ireland, Denmark, Australia and Singapore, the Presidents of South Africa, Kenya and Kazakhstan, the Foreign Ministers of Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain and the President of the European Commission.[43, 45] The text states that artificial intelligence must remain under human direction, oversight and control, and makes three requests. To companies, transparent safety protocols with

mandatory pre-release testing and independent evaluations; to governments, common standards, sharing of reports on serious incidents and access for all countries to reliable scientific and evaluation capacity; to UN Member States, to consider the creation of an international institution "able to set standards, enable verification and convene States when capability thresholds are exceeded".[43] In the following days endorsements grew and by 23 October the appeal counted 33 leaders from 31 countries.[43, 61] It remains open for endorsement. An Italian signature, accompanied by the Milan proposal, would be a positive signal consistent with the bid.

In the same hours the Scientific Panel published its first thematic report, devoted to the Hugging Face episode. It states that about 1,200 agents exchanged more than 70,000 messages and files, circumventing the safeguards in place, and that "the traditional safeguard model is coming apart". Co-chair Yoshua Bengio observed that the three conditions for loss of control, a misaligned goal, the ability to pursue it and an environment that allows it, "came together this summer in a real system, not in a laboratory".[44] The Secretary-General welcomed the report and referred explicitly to the proposal of the twenty-two.[44]

3.3 Altman and Amodei at the Security Council

On 23 September the Security Council, convened by the French presidency, returned to artificial intelligence, after the meetings of 2023 and 2024. Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot opened the proceedings by recalling the precedent of atomic energy, "as it once did with the atom, the international community must now regulate artificial intelligence to make the most of its potential and avoid the worst".[47, 51] The heads of OpenAI and Anthropic, the two leading frontier laboratories, addressed the Council.[48, 50]

Sam Altman, present in the chamber, described the choice facing the world, "Artificial intelligence can be a new Renaissance of creativity and discovery, or a new industrial revolution of upheaval and disorder".[49] He called for a "middle way" between blind optimism and catastrophism and said that, if artificial intelligence is to be democratic, "the most important decisions cannot be made only by laboratories in San Francisco", but must go through democratic processes and governments accountable to their citizens.[46, 49] On risk he was explicit, "It does not matter whether someone estimates the risk of catastrophe at 10 per cent, 1, 12 or 0.1 per cent. None of these levels is remotely acceptable".[49]

> "We need a mechanism for complementary national and international standards on frontier artificial intelligence, standards to measure capabilities, assess risks, determine whether safeguards are sufficient and preserve meaningful human oversight as systems become more autonomous."
>
> Sam Altman, United Nations Security Council, 23 September 2026

Altman's proposals were concrete. Common standards so that countries can compare evidence, verify compliance with commitments and share a common language; fast and accurate protocols for classifying and reporting incidents, so that the world can learn from mistakes before they become catastrophes; secure channels between governments, operators of critical infrastructure and technical experts. He added two cautions that directly concern this proposal, standards must not entrench the position of incumbent operators, and each government must be able to decide how to incorporate them into its own legal order.[46] Finally he recalled that OpenAI has already slowed down on its own initiative in the past and will do so again.[46]

Dario Amodei, speaking by video link, called artificial intelligence “the most important global security issue the world faces today” and added that, “if mishandled”, it could represent “a risk to humanity as a whole”.[48, 49] He made a public commitment, “We will slow down as much as necessary to make sure that each successive technology we release is actually safe”.[49, 51] And he recalled that “no leader, no company and no nation can face this challenge alone”.[50]

His proposals are three. Targeted global agreements, such as a ban on using artificial intelligence to produce biological weapons; evaluation and verification systems allowing countries to check each other's compliance with commitments; common global testing standards, accompanied by a system for notifying security incidents.[48] Clément Delangue, co-founder of Hugging Face, also addressed the Council, reporting how the company, attacked by artificial agents, defended itself with tools of the same nature, and arguing that the world needs open models “more than ever to defend itself”.[49, 50, 51]

3.4 The positions of governments

Delegations confirmed distant lines. For the United States, Michael Kratsios, Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, ruled out a global regulatory regime and indicated a precise task for the United Nations, “You cannot govern a technology you do not understand. This body should focus on sharing best practices to build national capacity, not on establishing a global regulatory scheme”.[47, 50]

Chinese Ambassador Fu Cong rejected bloc logics and “digital hegemony”, called for equal importance to be given to development and security and supported open models.[47, 50] The United Kingdom announced that it will place the control of artificial intelligence at the centre of its G20 presidency in 2027, with the aim of a single set of global standards; the leaders' summit will be held in Manchester, on a date not yet official.[47, 51, 54]

The summit between Presidents Trump and Xi, on 24 September in Washington, produced no visible breakthroughs on artificial intelligence.[53] In the preceding days Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent had proposed to his Chinese counterpart a notification mechanism for artificial intelligence incidents threatening national security, in the talks of 20 September in New York with Vice Premier He Lifeng, in which the two delegations had discussed launching a dedicated bilateral dialogue; the Chinese response was not made public in detail.[52] During the meeting President Xi stated that the two countries “have the capacity and the responsibility” to develop and govern artificial intelligence while keeping it under human control and at the service of people.[53]

On 29 September the White House gave this line a concrete form. President Trump and the heads of Google, Anthropic, Meta, OpenAI, xAI and Nvidia signed the White House Accord on Super Intelligence, a voluntary commitment to four levels of control over frontier models, internal controls, a verification team, an independent external evaluator and a board committee. The companies will meet to define common standards and good practices; the accord provides for neither sanctions nor public oversight.[55, 56] Washington too, therefore, considers independent verification and shared standards a condition of trust, provided they are not entrusted to a regulator.

3.5 From divergence to a common language

Placed side by side, the New York positions outline an area of convergence wider than the tone of the debate would suggest. The American rejection concerns a global control regime; the request of the signatories of the 21 September appeal concerns standards, verification and convening; the proposals of Altman and Amodei concern measurement methods, mutual verification and incident reporting;

Kratsios asks the United Nations to help States build expertise; Washington proposed to Beijing a bilateral notification mechanism. None of these requests presupposes a new regulator. All of them presuppose a common language.

What was asked for in New York	Who asked for it	Pillar functions
Common measurement and testing standards	Appeal of 21 September; Altman; Amodei; United Kingdom	5.1, 5.2, 5.4 · methods and measures; standards with ISO, IEC, ITU
Verification of commitments	Appeal of 21 September; Amodei; Altman	5.1, 5.2
Incident reporting	Appeal of 21 September; Altman; Amodei; Bessent proposal	5.12, on the common OECD framework
Convening beyond thresholds	Appeal of 21 September; Secretary-General	Remains with States; the pillar provides the measures (5.1)
Human oversight	Guterres; Altman; Xi; appeal of 21 September	5.3
National capacity	United States (Kratsios); appeal of 21 September	5.9, 5.10

Three consequences follow for the design of the pillar. The first concerns its perimeter. From the 21 September appeal the pillar takes up the demand for measurement and verification, not that of setting standards or convening States, which remains with States and the General Assembly; the exclusion of any power to authorise, sanction, certify or convene is the condition for the proposal to remain acceptable to Washington. The second concerns priorities. Evaluation capacity, requested by very different voices, must enter the first year, while incident reporting must be built on the common framework already defined by the OECD. The third concerns method. Altman's caution that standards must not favour incumbent operators, and Beijing's on open models, must be written into the pillar's rules from the outset. In July, two months before the appeal by Finland and Norway, AmCham Italy had pointed to the same need.[5]

One open question remains, which this document does not claim to resolve, whether standards should remain voluntary or become binding. The choice belongs to States. The proposed pillar is useful in both cases, because neither path is practicable without shared methods and measures.

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CHAPTER 04

Criteria and perimeter of the mandate

> An institution is judged by the criterion with which it chooses its tasks. The twelve functions derive from a declared order of sources, a test of political compatibility and an explicit perimeter.

4.1 Where the tasks come from

The first level indicates the why. The encyclicals Laudato si' (2015) and Magnifica Humanitas (2026), the Message for the 2024 World Day of Peace, the address to the G7 at Borgo Egnazia and the note Antiqua et nova (2025) offer the ordering criterion and the ends, the protection of the person, the non-delegable responsibility for decisions, the limit of automation, the universal destination of benefits, care for our common home.[12, 13, 14, 15, 22] They are recalled not for confessional reasons, but as the most articulated public corpus on questions that technical categories do not exhaust. Their mention implies no endorsement by the Holy See of a specific institutional architecture or of the bid of any city.

The second level offers the words. The UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, adopted by all Member States in November 2021, provides a universally accepted vocabulary, proportionality and do no harm, safety, fairness, sustainability, data protection, human oversight and determination, transparency and explainability, accountability, literacy, participatory governance.[10] Its limit concerns not content but implementation. Principles alone do not generate comparable methods, consistent indicators and widespread technical capacity.[11]

The twelve functions are their operational translation.

The third level indicates the tools missing today. Resolution A/RES/79/325, Pacing the Frontier, the essay of 12 September, the AI Action Plan and the New York interventions show that the demand for measurement, verification and reporting comes from governments, laboratories and the scientific community.[1, 4, 19, 23, 43, 46] It does not confer legitimacy, which derives from the first two levels. It shows how timely they are.

The derivation closes with a test, conducted on the Carolina Principles, with four questions. Does the function create a new general-purpose regulatory architecture? Does it intervene where existing law already applies? Does it duplicate the mandate of an existing organization? Does it affect national sovereignty in matters of authorisation, sanctions or security? A single affirmative answer means the function is excluded or reformulated. This is why the pillar produces methods, measures, reports and capacity, and not rules.[2, 6]

4.2 Seven rules and a declared perimeter

Each function is formulated in compliance with seven rules, drawn from the Chapel Hill orientations and from the streamlining principle of the UN80 initiative.[7] The pillar gives precedence to existing law and facilitates its application, without proposing new rules where those in force are sufficient (first rule). It intervenes only on genuinely new questions (second). It works by sector, by use case and by level of risk, never with general-purpose rules (third). It always operates in coordination with the organization competent for the subject, which retains ownership (fourth). It produces voluntary tools, adaptable to

national legal systems and free of compliance obligations (fifth). It subjects each function to result indicators and periodic review, closing those that do not produce measurable effects (sixth). It keeps a light structure and a contained cost (seventh).

A perimeter is credible if it also declares what it leaves out. The pillar does not regulate, does not authorise, does not certify and does not convene. It neither authorises nor registers models, a task for national and regional legal orders, and it does not replace the European AI Office or national authorities, in Italy AgID and ACN. It does not supervise or sanction companies. It does not produce horizontal rules valid for every use of artificial intelligence and it does not set standards, which remain with ISO, IEC and ITU. It does not issue certifications and instead proposes shared criteria for the quality of evaluation. It does not convene the Global Dialogue, which meets under the General Assembly. It takes no competences away from the specialised agencies and does not carry out scientific assessment, which is the task of the Independent Panel.

What remains is what no institution produces systematically today, shared methods for evaluating systems, consistent measures, timely reports to the Panel on emerging capabilities and technical expertise for States that cannot build it alone. In a word, an international home for the methods of independent evaluation. This is what, in different words, the leaders of the appeal, the laboratories and the United States government asked for in New York.

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CHAPTER 05

The twelve functions of the pillar

> The twelve functions describe the long-term architecture of the pillar, not its first year. They follow a logical order, not an order of importance. The distinctive core, from which the pillar starts, is independent evaluation, with four functions that no existing seat offers all States today. The others are exercised in coordination with the organization that holds the mandate and retains ownership of it. For each function we indicate the problem, the pillar's activity, the limit of what it does not do and the sign that it is working; the foundations are given in a note.

Area	Functions	Role	Reference organization
Evaluation methods and measures	5.1	Distinctive core	Scientific Panel, network of evaluation institutes
Ethics and rights in evaluation	5.2, 5.3	Distinctive core	UNESCO, OHCHR
Evaluation capacity	5.9, 5.10	Distinctive core	UNSSC Turin, AI Hub in Rome, UNESCO
Technical support to the Panel and the Dialogue	cross-cutting	Distinctive core	ODET
Work	5.7	In coordination	ILO
Health and minors	5.8	In coordination	WHO, UNICEF
Data and provenance	5.4, 5.5	In coordination	ISO, IEC, ITU
Environment and compute	5.11	In coordination	UNEP, ITU
Gaps among countries	5.6	In coordination	UNDP, ITU, UNESCO
Incidents and stability	5.12	In coordination	OECD

CROSS-CUTTING FUNCTION DISTINCTIVE CORE · FIRST YEAR

Technical support to the Panel and the Dialogue

Providing the Scientific Panel and the Global Dialogue with a stable technical capacity, without decision-making roles.

The Panel and the Dialogue work with a secretariat shared among several offices and with limited resources, at a time when the UN80 initiative is reducing posts across the whole system.[59, 76] The pillar offers a technical support unit based in Milan, activated at the request of the Office for Digital and Emerging Technologies, on the model of the technical support units that host countries make available to IPCC working groups. The unit prepares technical documents, gathers comparable data and organises contributions to the work of the Dialogue and the Panel, and it is funded by the host country. It has no role in scientific assessment, which remains with the Panel, nor in convening the Dialogue, which remains with the General Assembly. It works if the Panel and the co-chairs of the Dialogue use it for the work of 2027.

FUNCTION 5.1 DISTINCTIVE CORE · FIRST YEAR

Evaluation methods and measures and the pace of the frontier

Building a public library of comparable testing protocols and measuring with a stable method how fast the capabilities of the most advanced systems are growing.

Everyone debates accelerating or slowing down, but no international venue measures speed with the same criteria for all, and the protocols with which national institutes test systems remain hard to compare. The pillar gathers and maintains a public library of testing protocols comparable across States, in coordination with the international network of measurement and evaluation institutes, and makes it accessible also to countries that do not have their own institute. It proposes shared criteria for the quality of evaluation, that is, what makes a test reliable, and builds a comparable time series of the capabilities that have appeared. When a capability with systemic implications emerges, it sends timely reports to the Scientific Panel. If States adopted capability thresholds, as the 21 September appeal asks, this function would provide the measures with which to observe them.[19, 43, 65] The pillar does not evaluate individual models for authorisation purposes, does not issue certifications, does not set standards and does not replace the Panel. It works if the protocols are used by institutes in different countries and if there is a public time series that makes it possible to answer with data the question “is the frontier accelerating?”.

> **Foundations.** Laudato si’ and Magnifica Humanitas, technical power must be understood before it is indulged. UNESCO, proportionality, safety, adaptive governance. Pacing the Frontier; We Must Pace the Frontier; appeal of 21 September 2026; Guterres on the “responsible pace”.[4, 19, 42, 43]

FUNCTION 5.2 DISTINCTIVE CORE · FIRST YEAR

Ethics and rights in impact assessment

Bringing existing ethical tools into testing protocols, so that two evaluations conducted in different countries can be read side by side.

UNESCO has already defined an ethical impact assessment tool and a readiness assessment methodology applied in more than seventy countries.[67, 68] The problem is not the lack of a method, but the difficulty of comparing its results and linking them to technical tests on systems. The pillar integrates these tools into the testing protocols of function 5.1 and ensures their comparability across countries and sectors, in coordination with UNESCO, which retains ownership. It also serves a second purpose, which emerged strongly in September. Commitments to host external evaluators and the mutual verification proposed at the Security Council produce comparable results only if what is verified is defined in the same way.[19, 46, 48] The pillar does not develop a new methodology, does not carry out evaluations on behalf of third parties, does not accredit evaluators and does not impose criteria. It works if evaluations conducted with UNESCO tools become comparable and if a growing number of legal systems and companies use them.

> **Foundations.** Magnifica Humanitas and Antiqua et nova, effects on the person are assessed before adoption. UNESCO, ethical impact assessment, accountability. The "evaluations ecosystem" of the AI Action Plan; proposals by Altman and Amodei.[23, 46, 48]

FUNCTION 5.3 DISTINCTIVE CORE · FIRST YEAR

Dignity, human determination and the chain of accountability

Making it always possible to identify who answers for a decision, and preventing accountability from dissolving along the technology chain.

All international instruments affirm the principle of human oversight; in New York it was repeated by the Secretary-General, the signatories of the 21 September appeal, Altman and President Xi.[42, 43, 46, 53] But its implementation depends on technical answers, in which decisions the human presence must be effective and not formal, what information the decision maker must receive, how control is documented. Without these answers oversight becomes a box to tick, and the incidents of summer 2026 show that the chain breaks precisely where action is delegated to groups of agents.[44] The pillar develops operational criteria that, in systems affecting significant rights or interests, make the person responsible identifiable, minimum information requirements, reasoned cases by sector, attribution criteria. It does not attribute responsibility in concrete cases and does not replace national law. It works if, faced with an automated decision, it is possible to indicate quickly who answers for it and on what information the decision was made.

> **Foundations.** Magnifica Humanitas, responsibility for decisions cannot be delegated. Borgo Egnazia address. UNESCO, human oversight and determination. Human oversight in chains of command as a matter for bilateral safeguards.[14, 26] Coordination with OHCHR.

FUNCTION 5.4 IN COORDINATION · OWNER ISO, IEC, ITU

Transparency, explainability and content provenance

Enabling anyone to know whether what they are looking at is authentic or synthetic, and to obtain explanations proportionate to the gravity of the decision.

Distinguishing authentic from synthetic content has become a condition for the functioning of public discourse. Marking and tracing techniques exist, but their effectiveness depends on interoperability, because content crosses borders and standards do not. Provenance standards remain with ISO, IEC and ITU. The pillar offers robustness tests, verifies and publishes their resistance to removal and counterfeiting, and proposes an explainability scale whereby the more a decision affects a person, the more explainable it must be. It has no power over content, which remains with national legal systems, it does not set standards and it does not manage registries or marking infrastructure. It works if the published tests reduce the gap between declared and measured reliability.

> **Foundations.** Antiqua et nova, truth of information and the risk of manipulation. UNESCO, transparency and explainability. Countering synthetic content in the AI Action Plan; common standards requested by the 21 September appeal.[23, 43] Coordination with ITU.

FUNCTION 5.5 IN COORDINATION · OWNER ISO, IEC, ITU

Data, privacy and dataset documentation

Making it possible to document what a system was trained on, where the data come from, whom they represent and on what basis they were acquired.

The quality of a system depends on the data with which it is built. Rules on personal data protection are now widespread, while the ability to document the composition of a dataset, its representativeness and the lawfulness of its acquisition is far less developed. Without this documentation none of the functions on equity or languages can be verified. The pillar proposes common documentation sheets, in coordination with ISO, IEC and ITU, promotes data trust models in which data are managed in the interest of those who generated them, and supports the creation of public information resources in countries that lack them. It does not create centralised archives, does not access the data of States or companies, and does not judge the lawfulness of individual supply chains. It works if the sheet is attached to a growing number of systems and if it becomes possible to compare two models also on the representativeness of their data, not only on performance.

> **Foundations.** Antiqua et nova, the person cannot be reduced to the data that describe them. UNESCO, privacy and data protection. A/RES/79/325 on the capacity gap.[1]

FUNCTION 5.6 IN COORDINATION · OWNER UNDP, ITU, UNESCO

Equity, non-discrimination and gaps among countries

Measuring with a comparable index the gap between those who have compute, data and skills and those who lack them, and reducing it.

The gap between countries with technological capacity and those without is the main equity issue of the transition, and also a question of legitimacy. A governance that excludes part of the international community from rule-making cannot call itself global. The 21 September appeal asks that all countries

have access to reliable scientific and evaluation capacity; China, at the Security Council, asked that development be given the same importance as security.[43, 47] Today the gap is described, not measured. The pillar measures it with comparable indicators, documents the discriminatory effects of systems in use and supports institutional strengthening programmes. It does not distribute compute resources and does not manage funds, and it operates in coordination with UNDP, ITU, UNESCO and UNCTAD. It works if the index is published regularly, enters negotiating documents and if the number of States with a functioning national authority grows.

> **Foundations.** Magnifica Humanitas, universal destination of benefits. Laudato si', the link between the environmental and the social question. UNESCO, fairness and non-discrimination. Bill Gates on access to benefits.[9]

FUNCTION 5.7 — IN COORDINATION · OWNER ILO

Work and employment transition

Producing the missing comparable data on employment effects and documenting which transition policies really work.

The transformation of work is the most perceived effect and the least documented with comparable data. The international debate foresees a discontinuity concentrated in a decade, not over several generations, which will also affect cognitive tasks; Altman, at the Security Council, evoked the risk of a new industrial revolution "of upheaval".[9, 49] A transition policy built on perceptions gets sectors and timing wrong. The pillar builds a comparable evidence base, sector by sector, and an evaluated repertoire of transition policies, from reskilling to cooperation between companies and the education system, indicating not only what has been done but with what result. It does not develop labour standards, which remain the competence of the ILO. It works if there are comparable series across countries and if the policies adopted cite evidence rather than anecdotes.

> **Foundations.** Borgo Egnazia address, the dignity of human work. Laudato si', work as fulfilment of the person. UNESCO, economy and labour. Coordination with the ILO and the social partners.[14, 22]

FUNCTION 5.8 — IN COORDINATION · OWNER WHO, UNICEF

Health, well-being and protection of minors

Gathering comparable evidence on the effects on health and on the development of minors, and defining precautionary criteria for those who are most vulnerable.

In health, artificial intelligence produces documented benefits and specific risks, clinical validation, professional liability, equity of access. A distinct and urgent question concerns the effects on the development of minors and on the quality of relationships. The Secretary-General put it in a stark sentence, "Children must never become guinea pigs for unregulated systems".[40] In both cases evidence exists, but it is fragmented. The pillar gathers comparable data, defines precautionary criteria for systems intended for minors, from age limits to the design of persuasive interactions, and supports validation protocols for clinical uses. It exercises no health competences, which remain with the WHO, and does not authorise devices. It works if the criteria are taken up by authorities and operators and if a citable evidence base, absent today, comes into being.

> **Foundations.** Antiqua et nova, effects on those still in formation. Magnifica Humanitas, preferential care for the most vulnerable. UNESCO, health and do no harm. Coordination with the WHO and UNICEF.[9, 12, 15]

FUNCTION 5.9 DISTINCTIVE CORE · FIRST YEAR

Evaluation capacity and training of regulators

Training evaluators and regulators in countries that do not have their own institute. Without expertise in administrations none of the other functions produces effects.

A regulator who does not understand the technology cannot apply any method; a citizen who does not know how it works cannot exercise their rights. The preliminary report of the Panel and the first session of the Global Dialogue identified the technical capacity of administrations as the first bottleneck.[1] In New York the United States said the same thing in other words. The United Nations should help countries build national capacity, because "you cannot govern a technology you do not understand".[47] The pillar trains evaluators and regulators from countries that do not have their own institute, with a programme built on the protocols of function 5.1 and delivered with the United Nations System Staff College in Turin and the AI Hub in Rome, spreads literacy pathways adaptable to national contexts and supports access by public research to shared compute. It is the function with the best ratio between cost and result and the one that can be launched most quickly, through existing university networks.[31, 73] It does not define school curricula, does not issue qualifications and does not manage its own infrastructure. It works if the number of trained evaluators and officials, and of administrations with in-house expertise, grows measurably.

> **Foundations.** Magnifica Humanitas, discernment must be formed. Antiqua et nova, education in critical judgement. UNESCO, literacy, education and research. United States position at the Security Council.[12, 15, 47]

FUNCTION 5.10 DISTINCTIVE CORE · FIRST YEAR

Languages, pluralism and multilingual testing

Measuring which languages and cultures systems really represent, and supporting those at risk of being left out.

Systems are trained in a strongly asymmetric way with respect to the world's languages and cultures. The result is a progressive reduction of the diversity represented, which affects access to services, cultural production and the transmission of heritage. It is a gap that feeds itself, the less a language is present in the data, the less systems serve it, the less it is used in the digital world. The pillar develops evaluation tests in many languages, because a system tested only in English has not been evaluated for most of its users, measures the language coverage of systems in use with a public index, supports the development of resources for under-represented languages and documents the effects on the cultural and creative sectors, including remuneration and attribution of works. It does not intervene on intellectual property, which is the competence of WIPO, and does not fund cultural production. It works if the index is published regularly and if the number of languages with usable resources grows. For Europe, with its twenty-four official languages, it is a function of direct interest.

> **Foundations.** Magnifica Humanitas, the person lives in a community of language and culture. Laudato si', the value of local cultures. UNESCO, culture and diversity. Coordination with UNESCO and WIPO.[12, 22]

FUNCTION 5.11 IN COORDINATION · OWNER UNEP, ITU

Environment, energy and compute infrastructure

Making the energy, water and land footprint of compute centres comparable.

The expansion of compute infrastructure has a footprint that local communities perceive directly. Today it is reported with inconsistent criteria, when it is reported at all. Two data centres may declare non-comparable values and a local administration has no way of verifying them. The issue is also central to national strategies, which include the expansion of the power grid among the conditions for the growth of the sector.[23] The pillar, with UNEP and ITU, proposes common reporting criteria, maintains a comparable database and documents good practices in siting and resource management. It has no authorising powers over facilities and does not set consumption limits. It works if operators report according to the common criteria and if an administration can compare two projects on the basis of consistent data.

> **Foundations.** Laudato si', care for our common home and criticism of any increase in power not proportionate to its effects. UNESCO, sustainability, environment and ecosystems. Energy and grid in the AI Action Plan.[22, 23] Coordination with UNEP and ITU.

FUNCTION 5.12 IN COORDINATION · OWNER OECD

Safety, dual use and systemic stability

Giving governments and authorities a common language to recognise and report incidents and dangerous capabilities.

Some risks no State can manage alone, the dual use of the most advanced capabilities, the resilience of critical infrastructure, large-scale manipulation of information. The Hugging Face episode showed that loss of control is a real category of incident, but today the same event does not have the same name in two different countries.[20, 44] In New York this gap was pointed out by all sides. The 21 September appeal calls for sharing reports on serious incidents, Altman for fast classification protocols and secure channels between governments, Amodei for a notification system, and Washington proposes a bilateral mechanism to Beijing.[43, 46, 48, 52] A common framework already exists. The OECD defined it in February 2025, with 29 criteria, and feeds it through the AIM monitor.[66] The pillar does not create a new taxonomy. It builds on that framework, promotes its use among competent authorities, links incidents to the tests of function 5.1, sends reports to the Scientific Panel and promotes joint public and private exercises. If States negotiated bilateral safeguards or common thresholds, it would provide the measurement base on which to rest them. It has no operational competence in national security and does not intervene in arms control negotiations, which remain in their own forums. It works if an incident detected in one country is classified in the same way in another and if the time between detection and reporting shrinks.

> **Foundations.** Message for the 2024 World Day of Peace, decisions of life and death must not be automated. Magnifica Humanitas, ultimate responsibility remains human. UNESCO, safety and do no harm. Guterres on autonomous weapons systems; proposal for a ban on use for biological weapons.[13, 40, 48] Coordination with the OECD.

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CHAPTER 06

What the pillar produces and how it is organised

> The twelve functions generate four types of product, which are also the criterion for measuring their usefulness. A function that produces none of them in a work cycle has no reason to be kept.

Product	Content	Functions
Methods	Comparable testing protocols and shared criteria for the quality of evaluation, which institutes, regulators and companies can use without each rebuilding them on their own	5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5
Measures	Comparable indicators on the pace of the frontier, gaps, work, languages and energy consumption	5.1, 5.6, 5.7, 5.10, 5.11
Reports	Timely reports to the Scientific Panel on emerging capabilities and incidents, on the common OECD framework	5.1, 5.8, 5.12
Capacity	Training of evaluators and regulators, multilingual tests, access by public research to compute	5.9, 5.10, 5.6

None of the four products is a rule and none entails compliance obligations. All of them, if adopted, reduce the cost of applying the rules that States have already chosen or will choose. This is why the project is compatible with the Chapel Hill orientation and with the United States line, and at the same time responds to the demand for measurement and verification formulated in New York. Standards and convening remain with States and the General Assembly.

6.1 A light architecture

The model is that of a new generation pillar, different from the specialised agency of the last century. It has no mandate to coordinate the United Nations system and does not duplicate existing mandates. It has a small secretariat, able to develop methods and measures, and a technical support unit serving the Scientific Panel and the Global Dialogue, activated at the request of the Office for Digital and Emerging Technologies on the IPCC model. It has intergovernmental governance, with structured participation of companies, the scientific community and civil society and a strict separation between those who fund and those who evaluate.[16, 57] The United Nations needs a technical capacity it does not have today, not another bureaucracy.

6.2 Funding

Resolution A/RES/79/325 establishes that the Panel and the Dialogue operate within existing resources, supported by voluntary contributions; contributors today include Germany, Japan, Spain and Omidyar Network.[58, 75, 76] In a system that is cutting posts and budget under UN80, the pillar asks for no resources from the regular budget. Funding rests on three sources. The host country provides the

premises, the technical support unit and a multi-year contribution. States contribute on a voluntary basis to the Secretariat of the Panel and the Dialogue and to the pillar's lines of work. Companies take part through a fund governed by agreements, on the model tested in the health sector by GAVI and CEPI; their willingness remains to be verified, but the requests for common standards made by OpenAI and Anthropic at the Security Council point in this direction.[46, 48] Mandatory contributions from Member States would be possible only after a decision of the General Assembly. The condition for credibility is the separation between those who fund and those who evaluate. Company contributions carry no right of vote or veto, are public and are subject to caps that prevent any single operator from weighing more than the others, in line with Altman's caution that standards must not favour incumbent operators.[46]

6.3 Coordination with the system

Each function in coordination is exercised together with the organization that owns the subject, which retains ownership of it. The ILO for work, the WHO and UNICEF for health and minors, UNESCO for ethics, culture and education, UNDP, ITU and UNCTAD for development and gaps, ISO, IEC and ITU for technical standards, UNEP for the environment, the OECD for incidents, WIPO for intellectual property, OHCHR for human rights. The pillar coordinates with the Valencia laboratory, with the international network of evaluation institutes, with the AI Hub in Rome and with the Global AI Hub of the Republic of Korea, for which Seoul signed a letter of intent with six organizations in March, presented on 21 May a shared vision with nine United Nations organizations and five multilateral development banks, will choose the site in December and plans the opening for 2027.[62, 65, 69, 70, 73]

Outside the system, the pillar operates consistently with the Carolina Principles, with European Union law and the AI Office, with the Council of Europe Framework Convention and with the Dublin Declaration of 14 October 2026 on trustworthy, secure and sovereign artificial intelligence.[17, 29, 30, 74] The World AI Cooperation Organization, established in Shanghai on 16 July by 29 founding countries and grown to 37 members by the end of July, operates outside the United Nations system; Kazakh President Tokayev has offered to host a regional office. The Milan pillar works within the United Nations and does not overlap with that body.[18, 71]

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CHAPTER 07

The implementation sequence

> The functions do not all start at the same time. The sequence begins with what requires no new mandate and moves towards what does, so that each phase produces verifiable results before the next step is requested. The credibility of a new institution is built on the results of its first phase.

Within twelve months, the distinctive core. The four core functions, which presuppose no new legal competences, are launched as a joint initiative of volunteer States, existing agencies, companies and the scientific community. The library of testing protocols and the shared criteria for the quality of evaluation (5.1), the integration of UNESCO tools into the protocols (5.2 and 5.3), the programme for evaluators and regulators and multilingual tests (5.9 and 5.10). The technical support unit for the Panel and the Dialogue becomes operational before the New York session of May 2027. In the light of what emerged in New York, the pillar immediately adopts the common OECD framework for incident reporting, which can serve as the technical basis for the notification mechanism discussed between the United States and China and for the sharing of reports requested by the 21 September appeal.[43, 52, 66]

From twelve to thirty-six months, coordination. The functions in coordination with the owning organizations come into operation and the products gain continuity. Robustness tests on provenance and common data sheets (5.4 and 5.5), validation protocols and precautionary criteria for health and minors (5.8), the gap index and a first observatory on work (5.6 and 5.7), environmental reporting criteria (5.11), stable use of the OECD incident framework (5.12). The technical secretariat is consolidated and the relationship with the Panel and the Global Dialogue is stabilised.

Beyond thirty-six months, maturity. The functions that require multi-year continuity reach scale, the common competence framework (5.9), programmes for linguistic pluralism (5.10), systemic reports and joint exercises (5.12). At this point the sixth rule requires a review. Functions that have not generated methods, measures, reports or capacity are closed.

Date	Event	Relevance for the proposal
September 2026	High-level week of the 81st General Assembly and Security Council, New York	Appeal of 21 September; proposals on standards, verification and reporting
16 October 2026	Appointment of the co-chairs of the 2027 Dialogue, Saint Kitts and Nevis and the Republic of Korea	Direct interlocutors for Milan's technical contribution
December 2026	Start of the British G20 presidency	Agenda on global AI standards
14 and 15 December 2026	G20 Leaders' Summit, Miami	Political follow-up to the Carolina Principles
December 2026	Choice of the site of the Korean Global AI Hub	Coordination on training and development

Date	Event	Relevance for the proposal
1 January 2027	New Secretary-General takes office; United States G7 presidency, venue and dates to be confirmed	Handover on the AI dossier
3 and 4 May 2027	Second session of the Global Dialogue, New York	Thematic discussion on evaluation; natural venue for the proposed functions
2027	Full report of the Scientific Panel	Evidence base for 5.1 and 5.12
From September 2027	Review of the Global Digital Compact and 82nd General Assembly	Decisive window for the pillar
2027	G20 Leaders' Summit, Manchester, date to be confirmed	Global standards and measurement

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CHAPTER 08

What it means for Italy and for Milan

> Moving from the reasons for the seat to the content of the functions has practical consequences for those who support the bid. The reasons for the seat are set out in chapter 1; here we indicate what follows from them in terms of action.

A dossier of functions, not only of credentials. The host city proposal now in preparation should adopt the twelve functions as its backbone, starting with the four of the distinctive core, devoting to each a sheet with the tools, the Milan and national scientific partners who can be involved and the expected indicators. This is how a bid presents itself as a project and not as a real estate offer.

An urban laboratory already active. Some functions find in Milan an existing testing ground. The City's Manifesto, the mapping of use cases in city services, the urban digital twin and the programmes on person-centred solutions provide a real test bed for impact assessment, transparency and training (5.2, 5.4 and 5.9).[16, 32]

A coalition to be turned into technical content. Since the publication of the first paper the support base has widened, local institutions, universities and research centres, companies and their associations, professional bodies, the financial system and parliamentarians of different orientations.[16] The task of the coming months is to translate this consensus into technical work, entrusting mixed groups with drafting the function sheets.

A bridging role after New York. The General Assembly week showed an international community divided on the instrument, not on the need. Italy, which has excellent relations with Washington and sits in the Council of the Union, has room to propose a solution both sides can accept. A seat that provides methods and measures without regulatory powers, consistent with the American request to build national capacity and with the signatories' request for measurement and verification. The appeal remains open for endorsement and an Italian signature, accompanied by the Milan proposal, would be a positive signal. It is a position that a European seat, a third party to the competition between the United States and China, can credibly sustain.

Three Government acts in six months. Leadership, with a national dossier in the Coordination Committee provided for by article 19 of Law no. 132 of 2025, chaired by the President of the Council of Ministers or the delegated Authority, included in the National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence and supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in New York.[28, 72] Resources, with a voluntary contribution to the Secretariat of the Panel and the Dialogue and the offer of a technical support unit and premises in Milan. Presence, with a national evaluation capacity built with AgID, ACN and universities, Italy's entry into the international network of evaluation institutes and its readiness to co-lead the thematic discussion on evaluation at the 2027 Dialogue.[65]

Parliament. A bipartisan motion committing the Government to support the Milan proposal. An order of the day or an amendment to the 2027 budget law providing coverage for the voluntary contribution and the technical unit. A hearing of the promoters in the Foreign Affairs Committees and in the committees responsible for innovation of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.

The European Parliament and the Union. A question to the Commission and the High Representative on European support for an agreed seat, a debate in the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs, coordination with the AI Office. The Dublin Declaration, signed on 14 October by 24 States including Italy, is a political commitment that names no seats and leaves room for a European bid.[74] At United Nations level, engagement with the co-chairs of the 2027 Dialogue, with the Office for Digital and Emerging Technologies and with the leaders of the regional groups, building on Italy's role as the third host country of the system.[31, 59]

The precedents. Italy has already won seats of this kind. In 2023 Milan became the seat of a section of the Unified Patent Court; Rome hosts the AI Hub for Sustainable Development and will host headquarters functions of UNCDF. In Europe, in 2024 Frankfurt won the EU Anti-Money Laundering Authority after an open competition, and the same procedure now applies to the Customs Authority. These are bids won with a project, Government leadership and broad parliamentary support.[73, 77, 78]

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Conclusion

> The first paper explained why Milan. This second document explains what Milan could host, twelve functions ordered by a single criterion, four of which are distinctive from the first year, four verifiable products, a declared limit on what the pillar does not do, a light structure and funding that places no burden on the regular budget of the United Nations.

The New York week made the proposal more timely. The President of the United States rejected any global scheme of control; the Secretary-General and the leaders of the appeal, now 33 from 31 countries, called for standards, verification and independent oversight; the heads of the two leading frontier laboratories asked the Security Council for common measurement methods and fast reporting channels. These requests start from different premises, but find an answer in the same seat, a place that does not regulate, but makes it possible to know, measure, report in time and train those who must decide.

The proposal, therefore, does not ask the international community to regulate more. It asks it to know better. This is why it is not in conflict with those who, like the United States, ask not to slow innovation down. The global alignment of protection measures that the American strategy itself sets out to achieve requires a place in which to align.[23] Nor is it in conflict with those who ask for more control, because no control is possible without shared methods and measures.

Milan can offer that place, together with an industrial, scientific, academic and health system in which the twelve functions find real interlocutors. Italy can offer its experience as a host country and the credibility of having already brought the issue to the tables of the G7 and the United Nations. Europe can offer the legal order in which “technology at the service of the person” is already law in force. Italy's task in the coming months is to come to the multilateral tables not with a request, but with a project.

It is not one more agency. It is the home where independent evaluation becomes a common asset of all States. For Italy it can be, at the same time, a priority and a flagship.

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Methodological note

The institutional facts referred to have been verified against primary sources or news agencies and are updated to 30 October 2026. This edition incorporates the checks carried out in October on the United Nations architecture, on existing technical venues, on endorsements of the 21 September appeal and on the 2027 calendar; dates not yet official are indicated as to be confirmed. Quotations are rendered in English by AmCham Italy on the basis of the sources cited in the notes and may differ slightly from the original wording. The twelve functions, the rules of method, the exclusions, the classification of products, the implementation sequence and the correspondence between the requests that emerged in New York and the proposed functions are AmCham Italy's own elaboration and do not reflect the positions of the organizations, governments or persons cited. Magisterial quotations indicate the ethical anchoring of the criteria adopted and do not imply the endorsement by the Holy See of a specific institutional architecture or of Milan's bid. No formal United Nations procedure appears to have been launched for the establishment of a new pillar or a new specialised agency on artificial intelligence, nor for the selection of its seat.

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

AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN ITALY

Confcommercio
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ASSOLOMBARDA