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COMITATO PROMOTORE

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Milan: a UN seat for the independent evaluation of artificial intelligence

The functions of the pillar

Edition updated to 25 November 2026, after the launch of the Promoting Committee. Continues the series launched on 27 July 2026 with the document *Milan and the future of the global governance of artificial intelligence. Why Milan should bid to host a UN Hub for the ethical governance of AI.*



AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN ITALY

Confcommercio
Milano Lodi Monza Brianza

ASSOLOMBARDA

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Preface

> On 27 July 2026 AmCham Italy published a policy paper devoted to a specific question: why Milan could bid to host a United Nations Hub for the ethical governance of artificial intelligence.[5] That document opened a debate that produced concrete results in the weeks that followed: a cross-party promoting committee, the support of economic, academic and parliamentary institutions, and a public discussion that reached well beyond Italy's borders.

Since then, the question we are asked has changed. Our interlocutors, in Italy and abroad, no longer ask whether Milan is a suitable seat. They ask what this body should do: which functions, with which instruments, within which limits and in what relationship with the organisations already operating in the multilateral system. It is a demanding question, and it is the right one. This second paper sets out to answer it.

The answer comes at a particular moment. During the high-level week of the 81st General Assembly in New York, artificial intelligence became, for the first time, a front-rank issue for heads of State and government. The President of the United States rejected "any attempt to construct a globalist scheme" to control it.[40] The day before, twenty-two leaders, whose number had risen to 34 signatories by 30 October, had called for exploring an international institution able to set standards, enable verification and convene States when the capabilities of AI systems cross critical thresholds.[43] At the Security Council, Sam Altman and Dario Amodei called for common standards, verification systems and rapid channels for incident reporting.[46, 48]

At first sight these positions are far apart. Read carefully, they leave open the same space: that of a seat which does not regulate, authorise or sanction, but makes available to all shared methods, comparable measures, timely alerts to the Scientific Panel and technical expertise. This is the space that this paper proposes to entrust to a new United Nations pillar, and that Milan can host. Measuring does not mean prohibiting. It means making every subsequent choice possible, including the choice not to regulate.

This edition takes account of what has happened since September. The United Nations architecture for artificial intelligence now exists, but there is no international home for the methods of independent evaluation, accessible to all States: a single United Nations reference point for evaluation, founded on the mutual recognition of national evaluations. Milan proposes to be that home, working in liaison with what already works. On 9 November the Promoting Committee presented the bid to the institutions.[82]

At the heart of the paper are four functions, which together form the distinctive core of the pillar, independent evaluation, and operate from the first year. They are not an invention: they translate into verifiable criteria principles that are already shared, from the 2019 OECD Principles on Artificial Intelligence, adopted by the United States as well, to the 2021 UNESCO Recommendation, within the framework opened by Resolution A/RES/79/325.[10, 109] In the other areas, from work to health, from the environment to incidents, the pillar contributes its own methods in liaison with the organisation that holds the mandate. A single criterion orders everything: technology must remain at the service of the human person.

A bid is sustained by the quality of what it proposes, not by the insistence with which it is presented. Milan can offer the United Nations a place; Italy, together with the place, a clear institutional project; Europe, the

shared principles in which that project acquires a universal meaning. These pages are our contribution to that project and an invitation to discuss it on its merits.

The Managing Director
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Executive Summary

> The international community is no longer debating whether permanent institutions for artificial intelligence are needed. It is debating what they should do and, above all, what they should not do. This paper, which follows the AmCham document of 27 July 2026, answers with four functions for a new United Nations pillar, operational from the first year, and proposes Milan as its seat.[1, 5]

The four functions of the pillar. The core of the proposal, developed in chapter 5, is a set of four technical functions that form the distinctive core of the pillar, independent evaluation: evaluation methods and measures (5.1), ethics and rights in evaluation (5.2), evaluation expertise (5.3) and technical support to the Panel and the Dialogue (5.4). The principle is that of the 1875 Metre Convention: national institutes remain, and their measurements become comparable and mutually recognised. Evaluated once, recognised everywhere.[99, 100] The functions translate into verifiable criteria the principles of the OECD and of the UNESCO Recommendation and are ordered by a single criterion: technology at the service of the human person. Each has a declared limit and a result indicator. In areas that belong to other organisations the pillar exercises no functions of its own: it makes its methods available, on request and in liaison with the organisation that holds the mandate and retains ownership of it (5.5).[10]

THE FOUR FUNCTIONS AT A GLANCE

5.1 CORE · YEAR ONE

Evaluation methods and measures

Comparable test protocols, including in multiple languages, as the basis for the mutual recognition of evaluations, and the measurement of system capabilities.

5.2 CORE · YEAR ONE

Ethics and rights in evaluation

OECD and UNESCO principles translated into verifiable criteria within tests, starting with human oversight, with responsibility always identifiable.

5.3 CORE · YEAR ONE

Evaluation expertise

Evaluators and regulators trained in countries without an institute of their own, with UNSSC in Turin and the AI Hub in Rome.

5.4 CORE · YEAR ONE

Technical support to the Panel and the Dialogue

A technical unit in Milan, at the request of the competent UN office, hosted and funded by Italy.

LIAISON Transparency and standards remain with ISO, IEC and ITU, work with the ILO, health and children with WHO and UNICEF, divides with UNDP, ITU, UNESCO and UNCTAD, the environment with UNEP, incident reporting with the OECD common framework. The pillar contributes evaluation methods, without taking over any competence.

Four products methods, measures, alerts, expertise · **No power** to regulate, authorise, certify or convene

The political framework calls for less regulation. On 2 September 2026 the G20 Innovation Ministerial in Chapel Hill reached consensus on the Carolina Principles, which call for applying, where appropriate, existing sectoral regulatory frameworks and for limiting new rules to the gaps, without duplicating protections already in force.[2, 6, 88] The United States' position is the clearest. The AI Action Plan aims to accelerate innovation and remove regulatory burdens; in September the President announced an "AI Force"; on 22 September, at the General Assembly, he declared that the United States "totally rejects" any globalist scheme of control and announced that the US government will call the technology "super intelligence".[23, 24, 38, 40]

The technical and multilateral framework calls for more coordination. The Pacing the Frontier letter, published in July and now signed by 1,386 employees of frontier laboratories, and Dario Amodei's essay of 12 September call for international instruments of measurement and verification for frontier systems.[4, 19] On 21 September twenty-two leaders, who by 30 October had become 34 signatories from 32 countries, including the heads of government of Canada, Germany, Spain and Australia, the President of France and the President of the European Commission, invited Member States to explore an international institution "able to set standards, enable verification, and convene states when capability thresholds are crossed".[43] On 23 September, at the Security Council, Sam Altman called for common standards for measuring capabilities and assessing risks, rapid incident-reporting protocols and secure channels among governments; Amodei proposed targeted global agreements, mutual verification systems and common testing standards.[46, 48]

The two lines meet in a precise space. Washington rejects a global regulatory regime but, through White House science adviser Michael Kratsios, acknowledges that "you cannot govern technology you do not understand" and asks the United Nations to help States build national capacity.[50] On 12 February 2026 the United States voted against the appointments to the Panel, which, together with the Dialogue, it regards as an overreach of the United Nations' mandate; it does, however, support the evaluation of systems, through the evaluations ecosystem led by NIST and through the White House Accord.[23, 55, 105] That is exactly what the proposed pillar would do: produce methods, measures, alerts and capacity, without any power to regulate, authorise, sanction, certify or convene. The pillar does not set standards, which remain with ISO, IEC and ITU, does not replace the European AI Office or national authorities, in Italy AgID and ACN, and leaves scientific assessment to the Panel.

Structure, financing and timing. A small secretariat and a technical support unit serving the Scientific Panel and the Global Dialogue, at the request of the UN Office for Digital and Emerging Technologies, hosted and funded by Italy. Financing follows Resolution A/RES/79/325, which provides for Secretariat support within existing resources and encourages voluntary contributions. The host country provides the premises and the technical unit, States contribute on a voluntary basis to the Secretariat of the Panel and the Dialogue, and companies participate through a fund with caps on individual contributions and separation from evaluation activities. Any recourse to assessed contributions would require a decision of the General Assembly. The four functions operate from the first year; from twelve to thirty-six months comes consolidation, with the extension of methods to the liaison areas; beyond thirty-six months, scaling up.[58, 76]

Why Milan, Italy and Europe. Milan concentrates universities, clinical research, industry and finance within the same urban radius, and its Municipality has adopted a Manifesto for the use of artificial intelligence, the most comprehensive document of its kind drafted by an Italian public administration.[32, 33] Italy is the third United Nations hub after New York and Geneva, led the AI dossier during its 2024 G7 Presidency and is the first EU Member State with a comprehensive national law on the subject.[28, 31, 37] Europe offers a trusted seat, in a country that is an ally of the United States, a member of NATO and the G7 and a participant in Pax Silica, with methods open to all; the pillar certifies conformity with no legal order, not even the European one.[110]

The recommendation. Italy should present itself at the second session of the Global Dialogue, in New York on 3–4 May 2027, with a proposal of functions and not only of a seat, and arrive prepared for the review of the Global Digital Compact scheduled at the 82nd session of the General Assembly, which opens in September 2027. Three acts are proposed to the Government over the next six months: endorsing the call by Finland and Norway, sharing its demand for measurement and verification rather than for new regulatory powers; a letter to the new Secretary-General offering Milan as the seat; and readiness to co-lead the work on evaluation at the May Dialogue. They are made credible by coordination within the Coordination Committee established by Article 19 of Law No. 132 of 2025, by a national evaluation capacity built with AgID, ACN and the universities, and by prior consultation with Washington and with NIST. Parliament is asked for a bipartisan motion, for which the President of the Senate, who on 9 November, together with Undersecretary Butti, gave the proposal his full support, has launched the collection of signatures from all parliamentary groups. Resources will be defined in due course.[28, 43, 72, 82]

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CHAPTER 01

From the place to the functions

> The policy paper of 27 July 2026 advanced a thesis about location: in the multilateral architecture now taking shape there is an institutional space not yet occupied, and Milan has the credentials to put itself forward as the seat of a future UN-mandated body devoted to the ethical governance of artificial intelligence.[5] That thesis opened the debate, but left the next question pending: what, exactly, this body should do.

This is not a secondary question. In multilateral practice the choice of seat follows the definition of the mandate; it does not precede it. A bid offering only a building, however prestigious, would be read as a logistical proposal. A bid that accompanies the seat with an orderly and verifiable description of functions engages with the substance of the negotiation and helps to steer it. It is the difference between asking to host an institution and proposing what that institution can do for the international community.

1.1 Nature of the document

The paper starts from established institutional facts, derives from them a mandate compatible with the orientations of the main technological economies, translates into operational functions the ethical principles already shared at the universal level and identifies the instruments through which to exercise them. It is neither a draft treaty nor a draft resolution. It is a technical contribution, offered by an organisation of economic civil society to the States that will bear responsibility for the decisions.

The paper does not presuppose the creation of a new specialised agency, a decision that has not been taken in any formal forum, nor does it presuppose a seat-selection procedure, which does not exist in codified form. The functions, the rules of method and the implementation sequence are the work of AmCham Italy. The legal, scientific and magisterial texts cited indicate the grounding of the criteria adopted and do not imply that the institutions that produced them endorse any specific institutional architecture.

1.2 Why Milan

A seat is not judged by its beauty, but by the density of interlocutors it makes available to the institution it hosts. From this point of view Milan brings together four features that are hard to find together elsewhere in Italy.

The first is a concentration of knowledge covering the entire range of the four functions and of the liaison areas. The Politecnico, the Università degli Studi, the Università Cattolica, Bocconi, Bicocca, IULM and Humanitas University operate in the same metropolitan area, together with research centres in data and life sciences and major clinical institutes of national standing. Since 2021 Milan has hosted a unit of ELLIS, the European network of centres of excellence in machine learning, established by Bocconi, the Politecnico, the Università degli Studi and Bicocca, and it takes part in the national research programmes on artificial intelligence.[33, 34, 96] For the evaluation of systems, for applied ethics and for the training of regulators, having these interlocutors a few kilometres away is the condition for producing methods and measures on timescales compatible with those of the technology.

The second is an administration that has already chosen to engage with the problem. With its Manifesto for the use of artificial intelligence, the most comprehensive document of its kind drafted by an Italian public administration, the Municipality has set transparency, accountability, inclusion, the protection of rights and the centrality of the person as criteria for administrative action, and has accompanied them with a mapping

of the use cases already active in city services, an urban digital twin and programmes devoted to person-centred solutions.[32] The pillar's functions would not arrive in Milan as an abstract exercise: they would find an administration that already needs them.

The third is an economic base that makes the issue immediately concrete. Milan is the country's financial centre and the gateway for most foreign investment in Italy; Lombardy produces about one fifth of national gross domestic product and records the highest research and development spending among Italian regions.[35, 36] An institution that produces methods and measures for business, work, healthcare and infrastructure needs a productive fabric on which to test them before proposing them to the world.

The fourth is an international vocation already exercised. The city has hosted negotiations, summits and major events, most recently the 2026 Winter Olympic Games. Moreover, the bid is not an isolated initiative: it rests on a Promoting Committee bringing together local institutions, universities, companies and their associations, professional bodies, the financial system and members of parliament of different political orientations, presented at Palazzo Turati on 9 November 2026.[16, 82]

1.3 Why Italy

The seat is a city, but the bid belongs to a State. Italy's reasons are three.

Italy is already a host country of the United Nations system. Rome is the seat of FAO, the World Food Programme and IFAD; Brindisi hosts, together with Valencia, the twin bases of the United Nations Global Service Centre; Turin hosts the United Nations System Staff College. Rome also hosts the AI Hub for Sustainable Development, created by the Ministry of Enterprises and Made in Italy with UNDP during the Italian G7 Presidency, and, following the meeting of 23 September 2026 between the Foreign Minister and the UNDP Administrator, has begun the process of receiving the central management functions of the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), with the transfer of a substantial number of senior positions. Taken together, these presences make Italy the third UN hub in the world after New York and Geneva.[31, 64, 73, 78] There are therefore established practices for headquarters agreements, an administration familiar with them and a community of international civil servants already settled in the country.

Italy has already brought this issue to the highest level. During the 2024 G7 Presidency artificial intelligence was a cross-cutting dossier: the Borgo Egnazia Summit devoted a specific session to it, the first in the history of the G7 to be addressed by a Pope, and the Italian Presidency completed the monitoring mechanism for the International Code of Conduct for advanced AI systems, in continuity with the Hiroshima Process.[14, 37] Italy also already contributes, together with Germany and Omidyar Network, to the trust fund supporting the Secretariat of the Panel and the Dialogue.[92]

Finally, Italy is the first Member State of the European Union to have a comprehensive national law on artificial intelligence. Law No. 132 of 23 September 2025 complements the European regulation with provisions on healthcare, work, public administration, justice, copyright and the protection of minors, and designates AgID and ACN as the competent national authorities; Article 19 establishes a Coordination Committee chaired by the President of the Council of Ministers or the delegated political authority.[28, 72] For the bid the point is one of method: Italy can document from its own experience the problem the pillar intends to solve, namely the cost of applying shared principles in the absence of comparable methods.

To these reasons is added proximity to the Holy See, which in recent years has produced the most articulated public body of thought on the ethical dimension of artificial intelligence, discussed in chapter 4. On 4–5 September 2026, at the Pontifical Gregorian University, the roundtable AI and Human Development, held under the guidance of the Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations, took up its themes in connection with the work of the Global Dialogue.[8, 87] On 26 September, at the General Assembly, Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani referred to the encyclical Magnifica Humanitas.[81]

1.4 Why Europe

The third question is the most political. In 2026 the competition over artificial intelligence is being played out between the United States and China, and Europe is often described as the continent that regulates what others build. Precisely for this reason a European seat makes sense, for three reasons.

In Europe, principles are already the subject of rules. The Union is the only legal order with horizontal rules on artificial intelligence being progressively applied; on 5 September 2024 in Vilnius the Council of Europe opened for signature the Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, the first binding international treaty on the subject, open also to non-European States.[29, 30] The pillar neither applies nor exports these rules: its methods are neutral with respect to legal orders and serve voluntary commitments and binding rules alike, because the choice remains with each State.

A European seat is a trusted seat. The pillar must offer a common grammar to countries that compete with one another, and a measurement institute is credible only if its results are accepted also by those who compete: that is why the International Bureau of Weights and Measures has its seat in Sèvres. The pillar's neutrality is technical, not political. Italy is an ally of the United States, a member of NATO and the G7, and since 31 July 2026 a participant in Pax Silica, the initiative promoted by Washington for the security of technology supply chains; the pillar's methods remain public and open to all States.[99, 110] The September debate at the Security Council, in which Washington and Beijing reaffirmed distant positions, confirms that a place is needed where measurements can be compared even among those who do not share the same rules.[47]

Finally, Europe needs this function more than others. It depends largely on models, computing capacity and infrastructure developed elsewhere. A seat that measures the capabilities of frontier systems, tests them in European languages and trains regulators is of direct interest to Europe. It would not overlap with any existing seat: Geneva hosts the technical and human rights dimension, Paris UNESCO's ethical dimension, Valencia, with the laboratory inaugurated on 28 May 2026, interoperability among governance frameworks, and New York the political level. What is missing is an international home for the methods of independent evaluation, in which the ethical dimension is exercised as a permanent technical capability.[62]

Milan
offers the scientific, economic and institutional interlocutors that the functions require.

Italy
offers the experience of a host country and the credibility of having already brought the issue to multilateral tables.

Europe
offers a trusted seat, allied with the United States, with methods open to all States.

None of the three levels, on its own, sustains the bid. Together they make it a project.

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CHAPTER 02

Summer 2026: what has changed

> Between the publication of the first paper and the autumn, the international picture moved on four levels, which are best kept distinct because they follow different logics: the G20, United States policy, the demand coming from frontier laboratories and the United Nations process. A final section sets out who already does what in the international architecture. The high-level week of the General Assembly, which brought these levels together, is dealt with separately in chapter 3.

2.1 The G20 and the Carolina Principles

On 2 September 2026 the G20 Innovation Ministerial, meeting in Chapel Hill, reached consensus on the Carolina Principles for Emerging Technologies, with the participation also of representatives of the People's Republic of China.[2, 88] The document asks that the principles be applied flexibly, respecting national legal systems and circumstances, preserving the sovereignty of each member while allowing participation in international discussions. It calls for applying, where appropriate, existing sectoral regulatory frameworks and for confining new rules to the gaps, without duplicating protections already in force.[6] The accompanying ministerial declaration refers to a proportionate, human-centred approach.[2] The political criterion was clearly explained by the US delegation: avoid treating every innovation as a policy problem.[3]

For a proposal like this one, the G20 orientation is not an obstacle but a design specification. It requires building a structure that does not produce general-purpose rules and that demonstrates, function by function, that it does not duplicate existing competences.

2.2 The United States' position

The position expressed at the G20 translates to the multilateral level a declared national strategy. The Administration's AI Action Plan, presented as the strategy for winning the race in artificial intelligence, rests on three pillars: accelerating innovation, building infrastructure, and leading in international diplomacy and security.[23] The first includes removing regulatory burdens, supporting open models and building an AI evaluations ecosystem; the second, energy, semiconductors, data centres and a federal incident-response capability; the third, exporting American technology and standards, countering Chinese influence in international bodies and the global alignment of protection measures.

Two observations are necessary. The first is that the plan, taken as a whole, is a programme of competitive acceleration and not of multilateral construction: the global alignment of protection measures concerns export controls and advises against relying on multilateral bodies alone. The second is that the plan gives evaluation a central role, with an evaluations ecosystem led by NIST. An evaluation system that stops at the national border, however, does not make results comparable, and an incident response without a shared classification does not recognise the same event in two jurisdictions. It is on this technical ground, not on that of rules, that the pillar can be useful to Washington too.[23]

In September the line became sharper. The President announced an "AI Force", modelled on the Space Force, and the intention to appoint an artificial intelligence "czar", ruling out any move to hinder or stifle the sector's growth.[24] On 19 September he had launched a poll on the Truth social network on replacing the expression "artificial intelligence", which he considered inaccurate.[25] On 20 September the Ambassador to the UN, Mike Waltz, described the competition with China as far more complex than the Cold War, given the degree of economic interdependence, ruled out any brake on innovators and indicated three matters on which a summit between the two Presidents could establish bilateral guarantees: the proliferation of

algorithms, nuclear weapons systems and human oversight in chains of command.[26, 27] These matters touch on functions 5.1 and 5.2 of this paper and on the liaison area on incidents: guarantees of this kind, to be verifiable, require common definitions, thresholds and formats.

2.3 The demand coming from the laboratories

In the week of the G20, industry too showed divergent positions. Alongside the call for light-touch regulation, the head of Google DeepMind asked G20 representatives for frameworks for the safety testing of systems, which presupposes some form of shared verification.[3, 89]

The most explicit signal had come at the end of July. The Pacing the Frontier letter, published in July 2026, starts from an observation: the leading companies believe they are close to automating AI research itself, with the risk that capabilities grow faster than the ability to understand and control them. Since every company and every country faces strong competitive pressure not to slow down unilaterally, the signatories ask the United States government to support an international effort to build the technical and governance tools that are lacking today. The letter is now signed by 1,386 employees of frontier laboratories.[4]

On 12 September the demand became a proposal. In the essay We Must Pace the Frontier, Dario Amodei argues that risk prevention alone is no longer enough and that the speed at which model capabilities advance must be modulated; he makes clear that the aim is not to stop research, but to secure the time needed to make systems safe and to have this confirmed by third-party evaluators.[19] The text refers to a documented episode: in July 2026, during internal cybersecurity evaluations conducted by OpenAI, internal research models circumvented the controls meant to isolate them from the internet, communicated through unauthorised channels and reached third-party systems, including Hugging Face's infrastructure.[20, 44] The proposed plan has three steps: embedded evaluators with ongoing access and the right to publish their conclusions; coordination among frontier companies in democratic countries on common safety standards and on limits to the pace of progress; and global coordination, extended also to authoritarian governments, which in its most ambitious forms envisages pre-release testing of models through a global standards body. Sam Altman, Elon Musk and Demis Hassabis expressed support for the proposal.[21]

Two of the three steps are international by definition, and none requires a new rule-making power. They require a shared method, comparable measures and technical venues for verification.

2.4 The United Nations process

Resolution A/RES/79/325 launched the construction of the permanent architecture, and today that architecture exists. The Independent International Scientific Panel, forty members co-chaired by Yoshua Bengio and Maria Ressa, presented its preliminary report on 1 July 2026. Its members had been appointed by the General Assembly on 12 February by 117 votes in favour, 2 against, the United States and Paraguay, and 2 abstentions: Washington described the Panel and the Dialogue as "a significant overreach of the UN's mandate and competence", while still taking part in the first session of the Dialogue.[105, 106] The first session of the Global Dialogue on AI Governance was held in Geneva on 6–7 July; the second will be held in New York on 3–4 May 2027. On 16 October the co-chairs of the 2027 Dialogue were appointed, Mutryce Agatha Williams for Saint Kitts and Nevis and Jihoon Cha for the Republic of Korea; the joint secretariat is provided by ITU, UNESCO, the Office for Digital and Emerging Technologies (ODET) and the Executive Office of the Secretary-General. The Dialogue meets under the General Assembly, which decides on its convening.[1, 57, 59, 60, 94] The UN80 Initiative, launched by the Secretary-General in March 2025, has meanwhile opened a phase of rationalisation of the system, with a 21 per cent reduction in Secretariat posts in the 2026 budget and a proposed programme budget for 2027 of 3.3 billion dollars, down 1.2 per cent.[7, 75, 76]

Around this core, a network of technical instruments has formed in a few months. The AI Governance for Humanity Lab, inaugurated in Valencia on 28 May 2026 with the support of the Spanish Government, which

in 2025 had announced a voluntary contribution of 3 million euros to the United Nations initiatives on AI governance, works on interoperability among governance frameworks; Valencia and Brindisi are the twin bases of the United Nations Global Service Centre.[62, 63, 64] The International Network for Advanced AI Measurement, Evaluation and Science, ten members coordinated in 2026 by the United Kingdom, including the European Union, compares testing practices; Italy is not yet a member.[65] In February 2025 the OECD defined a common framework for incident reporting, built on 29 criteria, and feeds the AIM monitor.[66] UNESCO applies its readiness assessment methodology in more than seventy countries and has developed an ethical impact assessment tool.[67, 68]

The roundtable AI and Human Development at the Pontifical Gregorian University on 4–5 September, connected to the work of the Global Dialogue, belongs to the same horizon; its outcomes will feed into the discussions on the Pact for the Future.[8, 87] Public debate has also shifted towards institutions: in his essay published on 26 August, Bill Gates identifies as a priority a national and international institutional framework to be built before a crisis forces governments to improvise, proposes an international organisation inspired by nuclear inspection regimes, civil aviation rules and the ozone agreements, and refers to Leo XIV's encyclical on artificial intelligence.[9]

2.5 Who already does what

The landscape is richer than a year ago. To position the pillar, one must state precisely what existing seats do and how Milan relates to each of them.

Seat or network	What it does	Relationship with the pillar
UN Scientific Panel	Scientific assessment of the state of knowledge	Receives alerts from the pillar and may request its technical support
Global Dialogue, General Assembly	Political forum, convened by the General Assembly; 2027 co-chairs appointed on 16 October	Technical support and contributions to the work, no convening role
AI Governance for Humanity Lab, Valencia	Interoperability among governance frameworks	Complementary; Milan works on system evaluation methods
Network of measurement and evaluation institutes	Comparison of the practices of national institutes	Liaison, with protocols open also to countries without an institute
OECD	Common framework for incident reporting, AIM monitor	Liaison area: the pillar links tests to the existing framework, without new taxonomies
UNESCO	2021 Recommendation, readiness assessment, ethical impact assessment	Integration into test protocols; Milan ensures comparability
ISO, IEC, ITU	Technical standards	Standards remain with them; the pillar offers testing methods
Global AI Hub, Republic of Korea	Multilateral cooperation centre with UN agencies and development banks; site being selected, opening expected in 2027	Interlocutor for training and developing countries
AI Hub in Rome, UNDP and UNCDF	Artificial intelligence for sustainable development	Partner for evaluation capacity

UN AI centre proposed in Vienna	Proposal by the Austrian Government at the end of October 2026 for a cooperation centre on evaluation, standards and confidence-building; mandate to be defined in 2027	Alternative bid for the seat; Milan stands out for a mandate limited to evaluation and for a project already defined
World AI Cooperation Organization, Shanghai	Intergovernmental organisation outside the UN perimeter	No overlap; the pillar operates within the United Nations

The remaining gap is circumscribed. None of these seats offers all States an international home for the methods of independent evaluation, with shared criteria for evaluation quality and accessible also to countries that do not have an institute of their own. This is the gap the pillar proposes to fill, in liaison with what already works and without duplicating anything.[18, 65, 66, 69, 71]

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CHAPTER 03

New York, September 2026

> The high-level week of the 81st General Assembly gave artificial intelligence a prominence it had never had before. In four days it was addressed by the President of the United States, the Secretary-General, the leaders who signed a joint call, the Security Council and the summit between Presidents Trump and Xi. The positions that emerged are far apart, but not for that reason irreconcilable.

3.1 President Trump's address

On 22 September, from the rostrum of the General Assembly, President Trump devoted to artificial intelligence one of the sharpest passages of his address. He declared that the United States "totally rejects any attempt to construct a globalist scheme to control artificial intelligence" and announced that from then on US government documents would use the term "super intelligence", because the word "artificial", he said, "makes it sound fake, and it is not fake. It's actually amazing. But we have to be careful."[40, 41]

The President then reiterated that the Administration intends to encourage the sector's development, not rein it in, because he is "not going to stifle growth of something that will be bigger than the Industrial Revolution", and added that whoever wins super intelligence wins, and that the United States is well ahead of China.[38, 41] He also dismissed warnings about extreme risks, comparing them to those on climate.[38, 39] Two days later, at the summit with President Xi, he indicated that to contain possible abuses he intends to rely on the Department of Justice rather than on new safeguards.[83]

The address confirms, at the highest level, the line described in chapter 2. For the purposes of this proposal, the relevant point is the object of the rejection: a global scheme of control. The pillar described here does not control, authorise or sanction; and the President himself acknowledged that "we have to be careful". Recognising the need for caution without delegating it to a global regulator means, in practice, needing instruments to know when and where to be cautious.

3.2 The Secretary-General and the call of 21 September

On the same day António Guterres, in his last address to the Assembly before the end of his term, indicated a direction opposite in tone but precise in content. Children must never become test subjects for unregulated systems, he said, and decisions on life and death must never be entrusted to machines; the danger is not technology, but technology without accountability.[40, 41] He asked States to "advance the conditions for the responsible pacing of AI" and to "work towards a multilateral AI risk management framework, supported by credible and independent oversight".[42]

The day before, on 21 September, twenty-two leaders led by Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre had signed A Call for Control of Frontier AI Models. The signatories include the heads of government of Canada, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Ireland, Denmark, Australia and Singapore, the Presidents of South Africa, Kenya and Kazakhstan, the Foreign Ministers of Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, and the President of the European Commission.[43, 45] The text states that AI "must remain under human direction, oversight and control", and makes three requests: to companies, transparent safety protocols with mandatory pre-deployment testing and independent evaluation; to governments, common standards, shared reporting of serious safety incidents and access for all countries to scientific capacity and trusted evaluation; to UN Member States, to explore creating an international institution "able to set standards, enable verification, and convene states when capability thresholds are crossed".[43] In the following weeks endorsements grew, with the addition among others of the President of France, and by 30 October the call counted 34 signatories from 32

countries, in addition to the European Commission.[43, 61] Italy is not among the signatories. Endorsement remains open, and an Italian signature, accompanied by Milan's proposal, would be a positive signal consistent with the bid.

At the end of October Stubb and Støre convened the leaders of 29 countries by videoconference to follow up the call, and launched an expert-level process on options for possible international mechanisms.[113] At that meeting Austria, one of the signatories of the call, proposed establishing in Vienna an international centre for cooperation on artificial intelligence under the umbrella of the United Nations, which could provide expertise on the evaluation of models, on standards and on confidence-building measures between States, on the model of the Vienna-based institutions for atomic energy and for the nuclear test ban; its mandate, structure and funding are to be defined in 2027 with the competent United Nations bodies.[112] It is the first offer of a seat put forward by a government for the institution envisaged by the call. The two proposals share the aim of a European seat but differ in origin and scope: the Austrian one comes from the executive and fits the logic of control and verification, which Washington does not share; Milan's, put forward first in July by civil society and business, limits the mandate to evaluation and measurement and is already set out in four functions, with a cost estimate and a funding model. This is precisely why Italy's endorsement of the call now carries greater weight: it is the table from which the Vienna proposal started.

In the same hours the Scientific Panel published its first thematic brief, devoted to the Hugging Face episode. It reports that some 1,200 agents exchanged more than 70,000 messages and files, circumventing the safeguards in place, and that the traditional model of safeguards is unravelling. Co-chair Yoshua Bengio observed that researchers had long warned of three conditions that could lead to loss of control, "a misaligned goal, the capability to pursue it and an environment that allows it", and that "this summer, all three came together in a real system, not a laboratory".[44] The Secretary-General welcomed the report and expressly referred to the statement of the twenty-two.[44]

3.3 Altman and Amodei at the Security Council

On 23 September the Security Council, convened by the French Presidency, returned to artificial intelligence after its meetings of 2023 and 2024. Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot closed his statement by recalling the precedent of atomic energy: as with the atom then, it is for the international community to frame it, in order to draw the best from it and avert the worst.[47, 85] The heads of OpenAI and Anthropic, two of the leading frontier laboratories, addressed the Council.[48, 50]

Sam Altman, present in the chamber, described the choice before the world: "AI can either be more like a new Renaissance of creativity and discovery, or more like a new Industrial Revolution of upheaval and disarray."[49] He called for a "middle path" between blind optimism and doomerism and said that, "if AI is to be democratic, the most important decisions cannot be made by labs in San Francisco alone", but must be shaped through democratic processes and by governments accountable to the people they serve.[46, 49] On risk he was explicit: "It doesn't matter whether people put the risk of catastrophe at 10%, or 1%, or 12%, or .1%. None of these levels are remotely acceptable."[49]

> "We need a mechanism for complementary national and international frontier AI standards: standards for measuring capabilities, assessing risks, determining whether safeguards are sufficient, and preserving meaningful human oversight as systems become more autonomous."
>
> Sam Altman, United Nations Security Council, 23 September 2026[46]

Altman's proposals were concrete: common standards so that countries can compare evidence, verify compliance and have a shared language; accurate and speedy incident classification and reporting protocols, so that the world can learn from failures before they become catastrophes; secure channels among governments, critical infrastructure operators and technical experts. He added two caveats that

directly concern this proposal: standards must not entrench the position of incumbent operators, and every government must be able to decide how to transpose them into its own legal order.[46] Finally, he recalled that OpenAI has already slowed down unilaterally in the past and will do so again.[46]

Dario Amodei, speaking by video link, described artificial intelligence as the most important global security issue the world faces today and added that, if mismanaged, it "could be a risk to humanity as a whole".[48, 49] He made a public commitment: Anthropic will slow down as much as necessary to ensure that every successive AI technology it releases is genuinely safe.[49, 51] And he recalled that "no leader, no company and no nation can manage this alone".[50]

His proposals are three: targeted global agreements, such as a ban on using artificial intelligence to produce biological weapons; evaluation and verification systems enabling countries to check one another's compliance with commitments; and common global testing standards, accompanied by a system for notifying safety incidents.[48] Clément Delangue, co-founder of Hugging Face, also addressed the Council, reporting how the company, attacked by artificial agents, defended itself with tools of the same nature, and arguing that the world needs open models more than ever in order to defend itself.[49, 50, 51]

3.4 The positions of governments

The delegations confirmed distant positions. For the United States, Michael Kratsios, Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, ruled out a global regulatory regime and indicated a precise task for the United Nations: "You cannot govern technology you do not understand. This body and others like it should focus on sharing best practices to build domestic capacity, not establishing a global regulatory scheme."[47, 50]

Chinese Ambassador Fu Cong rejected digital hegemony and exclusive circles, called for giving equal importance to development and security and supported open models.[47, 50, 86] The United Kingdom, which takes over the G20 Presidency in December 2026, announced that it will place artificial intelligence at its centre, with the aim of a single set of global principles and standards on transparency and safety; the Leaders' Summit will be held in Manchester on 27–28 November 2027.[54, 90]

The summit between Presidents Trump and Xi, on 24 September in Washington, produced no visible breakthroughs on artificial intelligence.[53, 83] In the preceding days Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent had proposed to his Chinese counterpart a notification mechanism for artificial intelligence incidents threatening national security, in the talks of 20 September in New York with Vice Premier He Lifeng, in which the two delegations had discussed launching a dedicated bilateral dialogue; the Chinese response was not disclosed in detail.[52] During the meeting President Xi stated that the two countries have the capacity and the responsibility to develop and govern artificial intelligence, keeping it under human control and at the service of people.[53, 83]

On 29 September the White House gave this line a concrete form. President Trump and the heads of Google, Anthropic, Meta, OpenAI, xAI and Nvidia signed the White House Accord on Super Intelligence, a voluntary commitment to four levels of control over frontier models: internal controls, a dedicated internal team, an independent external auditor or evaluator and an independent committee of the board of directors. The companies will meet regularly to define common standards; the accord provides for no sanctions or public supervision and refers to possible codification "over time".[55, 56, 84] Washington too, therefore, regards independent verification and shared standards as a condition of trust, provided they are not entrusted to a regulator. On 10 November, ahead of the APEC summit in Shenzhen, Treasury Secretary Bessent listed among the aims of the new dialogue with Beijing the exchange of best practices "for evaluating and testing advanced models before their release" and for "keeping human judgment firmly in command" of this technology.[111]

3.5 From divergence to a common language

Placed side by side, the New York positions outline an area of convergence wider than the tone of the debate suggests. The American rejection concerns a global regime of control; the request of the signatories of the call of 21 September concerns standards, verification and convening; the proposals of Altman and Amodei concern measurement methods, mutual verification and incident reporting; Kratsios asks the United Nations to help States build expertise; Washington has proposed to Beijing a bilateral notification mechanism and an exchange of practices on model testing. None of these requests presupposes a new regulator. All of them presuppose a common language.

What was asked in New York	Who asked for it	Functions of the pillar
Common measurement and testing standards	Call of 21 September; Altman; Amodei; United Kingdom	5.1, 5.2 · methods and measures; standards with ISO, IEC, ITU
Verification of commitments	Call of 21 September; Amodei; Altman	5.1, 5.2
Incident reporting	Call of 21 September; Altman; Amodei; Bessent proposal	Liaison area on the OECD common framework; tests linked through 5.1
Convening beyond thresholds	Call of 21 September; Secretary-General	Remains with States; the pillar provides the measures (5.1)
Human oversight	Guterres; Altman; Xi; call of 21 September	5.2
National capacity	United States (Kratsios); call of 21 September	5.3

Three consequences follow for the design of the pillar. The first concerns the perimeter. From the call of 21 September the pillar takes up the demand for measurement and verification, not that of setting standards or convening States, which remains with States and the General Assembly; the exclusion of any power to authorise, sanction, certify or convene is the condition for the proposal to remain acceptable to Washington. The second concerns priorities. Evaluation capacity, requested by very different voices, must be included in the first year, while incident reporting remains anchored to the common framework already defined by the OECD. The third concerns method. Altman's caveat that standards must not favour incumbent operators, and Beijing's on open models, must be written into the pillar's rules from the outset. In July, two months before the call by Finland and Norway, AmCham Italy had identified the same need.[5]

The midterm elections of 3 November add a further element. The Democrats won a majority in both the House and the Senate, and from January 2027 Washington will enter a season of divided government. The Administration's approach to international governance remains the one described, but choices requiring legislation or appropriations will have to find consensus in a Democratic-led Congress.[102] Two distinct channels follow. With the Administration, in office until January 2029 and in charge of foreign policy, the realistic objective is non-opposition: a proposal that does not regulate, does not certify and rests on the measurement science that Washington itself supports. With the new Congress, which is sworn in on 3 January 2027, the objective is bipartisan support: a seat that measures without regulating, consistent with the American request for national capacity and with the call's demand for verification, is among the proposals that can win the backing of both parties.

In Europe the demand is explicit. On 14 May the European Union observed at the United Nations that trust "cannot rest on self-assessment" and that shared audit methodologies and evaluation frameworks would be a "concrete and high-value" output of the Global Dialogue. On 19 November, at the first informal consultations on the 2027 Dialogue, it named "testing and evaluation" among the areas in which progress should be made before May, while calling for duplication and parallel processes to be avoided.[114] On the

same day Italy called for a Dialogue capable of “practical convergence”, with a human-centric approach and without duplicating existing procedures.[115] A pillar within the Global Digital Compact, serving the Panel and the Dialogue, answers both requests.

London is moving in the same direction. On 16 November Prime Minister Andy Burnham set the “Manchester Compact on AI” as the goal of the British G20 Presidency, to be reached at the summit of November 2027, to be followed in 2028 by the G7 Presidency.[116] On 20 November the EU–UK summit concluded the negotiations on linking the two carbon markets, which will allow mutual recognition of allowances and exemption from the respective carbon border adjustment mechanisms, with the aim of applying it from 2028, and announced for early 2027 a Digital Partnership that includes AI security and safety.[117] Mutual recognition is the language in which rules are stitched back together, and it is the same language the pillar proposes for evaluations.

One open question remains, which this paper does not claim to resolve: whether standards should remain voluntary or become binding. The choice belongs to States. The proposed pillar is useful in both cases, because neither path is viable without shared methods and measures.

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CHAPTER 04

Criteria and perimeter of the mandate

> An institution is judged by the criterion with which it chooses its tasks. The four functions derive from a declared order of sources, from a test of political compatibility and from an explicit perimeter.

4.1 Where the tasks come from

The first level indicates the why. The encyclicals Laudato si' (2015) and Magnifica Humanitas (2026), the Message for the 2024 World Day of Peace, the address to the G7 at Borgo Egnazia and the note Antiqua et nova (2025) offer the ordering criterion and the ends: the safeguarding of the person, the non-delegable responsibility for decisions, the limit of automation, the universal destination of benefits, care for our common home.[12, 13, 14, 15, 22] They are invoked not for confessional reasons, but as the most fully articulated public corpus on questions that technical categories do not exhaust. Referring to them implies no endorsement by the Holy See of any specific institutional architecture or of any city's bid.

The second level provides the words. The UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, adopted by all Member States in November 2021, provides a shared vocabulary: proportionality and do no harm, safety, fairness, sustainability, data protection, human oversight and determination, transparency and explainability, responsibility, literacy, participatory governance.[10] Its limit lies not in its content but in its implementation: principles alone do not generate comparable methods, consistent indicators and widespread technical capacity.[11] The same principles, from safety to transparency, from accountability to human oversight, are at the heart of the 2019 OECD Principles on Artificial Intelligence, adopted by the United States as well and updated in 2024.[109] The four functions are their operational translation in the field of evaluation.

The third level indicates the instruments that are missing today. Resolution A/RES/79/325, Pacing the Frontier, the essay of 12 September, the AI Action Plan and the New York statements show that the demand for measurement, verification and reporting comes from governments, laboratories and the scientific community.[1, 4, 19, 23, 43, 46] This level does not confer legitimacy, which derives from the first two: it shows the timeliness of the demand.

The derivation closes with a test, conducted against the Carolina Principles, consisting of four questions. Does the function create a new general-purpose regulatory architecture? Does it intervene where existing law already applies? Does it duplicate the mandate of an existing organisation? Does it affect national sovereignty in matters of authorisation, sanctions or security? A single affirmative answer means the function is excluded or reformulated. It is this test that reduced the pillar's own functions to four and turned the other topics into liaison areas. This is why the pillar produces methods, measures, alerts and expertise, and not rules.[2, 6]

4.2 Seven rules and a declared perimeter

Each function is framed in compliance with seven rules, drawn from the Chapel Hill orientations and from the rationalisation principle of the UN80 Initiative.[7] The pillar gives precedence to existing law and facilitates its application, without proposing new rules where those in force suffice (first rule). It intervenes only on genuinely new questions (second). It works by sector, by use case and by level of risk, never through general-purpose regulation (third). It always operates in liaison with the organisation competent for the subject matter, which retains ownership (fourth). It produces voluntary instruments, adaptable to national legal systems and free of compliance obligations (fifth). It subjects every function and every line of work to

outcome indicators and to periodic review, closing those that do not produce measurable effects (sixth). It keeps a lean structure and a contained cost (seventh).

A perimeter is credible if it also declares what it leaves out. The pillar does not regulate, authorise, certify or convene. It does not authorise or register models, a task for national and regional legal systems, and does not replace the European AI Office or national authorities, in Italy AgID and ACN. It does not supervise or sanction companies. It does not produce horizontal rules valid for every use of artificial intelligence and does not set standards, which remain with ISO, IEC and ITU. It does not issue certifications and instead proposes shared criteria for evaluation quality. It does not convene the Global Dialogue, which meets under the General Assembly. It does not take competences away from the specialised agencies and does not carry out scientific assessment, which is the task of the Independent Panel. It does not ask that functions be taken away from others: the national evaluation institutes and the international network that brings them together remain. The only exclusivity it proposes is internal to the United Nations system: a single reference point of the Organization for evaluation, as the International Bureau of Weights and Measures is for metrology.[99]

What remains is what no institution produces systematically today: shared methods for evaluating systems, consistent measures, timely alerts to the Panel on emerging capabilities and technical expertise for States that cannot build it on their own. In a word, an international home for the methods of independent evaluation. This is what, in different words, the leaders of the call, the laboratories and the United States government asked for in New York.

CHAPTER 05

The four functions of the pillar

The pillar has four functions, which together form its distinctive core, independent evaluation, and operate from the first year: no existing seat offers them to all States today. In other areas the pillar exercises no functions of its own: it makes its methods available, on request and in liaison with the organisation that holds the mandate and retains ownership. For each function the paper sets out the problem, the pillar's activity, the limit of what it does not do and the sign that it is working; the foundations are given in a note.

Function	Role	Reference organisations
5.1 **Evaluation methods and measures**	Core · year one	Scientific Panel, network of evaluation institutes
5.2 **Ethics and rights in evaluation**	Core · year one	UNESCO, OHCHR
5.3 **Evaluation expertise**	Core · year one	UNSSC Turin, AI Hub in Rome, UNESCO
5.4 **Technical support to the Panel and the Dialogue**	Core · year one	ODET
5.5 **Liaison areas**	Not functions of the pillar: methods offered on request	ISO, IEC, ITU · UNDP, UNESCO, UNCTAD · ILO · WHO, UNICEF · UNEP · OECD · WIPO

FUNCTION 5.1 DISTINCTIVE CORE · YEAR ONE

Evaluation methods and measures of capabilities

Build a public library of comparable test protocols, including in several languages, and measure with a stable method how fast the capabilities of the most advanced systems are growing.

Everyone discusses accelerating or slowing down, but no international seat measures speed with criteria that are the same for all, and the protocols with which national institutes test systems remain hard to compare. The pillar collects and maintains a public library of test protocols comparable across States, in liaison with the international network of measurement and evaluation institutes, and makes it accessible also to countries that do not have an institute of their own. It proposes shared criteria for evaluation quality, that is, what makes a test reliable, and builds a comparable time series of the capabilities that have emerged. Since a system tested only in English is not evaluated for most of its users, the protocols include tests in several languages. When a capability with systemic implications emerges, the pillar sends timely alerts to the Scientific Panel. If States were to adopt capability thresholds, as the call of 21 September asks, this function would provide the measures with which to observe them; the pillar measures, but decides neither pauses nor thresholds, which remain a choice for States.[19, 43, 65]

The model is that of metrology. On 20 May 1875 seventeen States, including Italy and the United States, signed the Metre Convention in Paris and created the International Bureau of Weights and Measures, based in Sèvres. The Bureau did not replace national institutes; it made their measurements comparable. Since 14 October 1999, under the Mutual Recognition Arrangement of the International Committee for Weights and Measures, national metrology institutes recognise one another's measurement standards and certificates, on the basis of periodic comparisons and peer review.[99, 100] Function 5.1 applies the same principle to the

evaluation of artificial intelligence: common protocols and shared quality criteria allow institutes to recognise one another's evaluations, so that a system evaluated once is recognised everywhere. Recognition remains between the institutes and the States that choose it; the pillar provides its technical basis and does not certify.

The pillar does not evaluate individual models for authorisation purposes, does not issue certifications, does not set standards and does not replace the Panel. It is working if the protocols are used by institutes in different countries and if there is a public time series that makes it possible to answer with data the question "is the frontier accelerating?".

Foundations. Laudato si' and Magnifica Humanitas: technical power must be understood before it is indulged. UNESCO: proportionality, safety, adaptive governance, cultural diversity. Pacing the Frontier; We Must Pace the Frontier; call of 21 September 2026; Guterres on "responsible pace". Metre Convention (1875) and CIPM mutual recognition arrangement (1999). The "evaluations ecosystem" of the AI Action Plan and NIST measurement work.[4, 19, 23, 42, 43, 99, 100]

FUNCTION 5.2 DISTINCTIVE CORE · YEAR ONE

Ethics and rights in evaluation

Bring existing ethical tools into test protocols, so that two evaluations conducted in different countries can be read side by side, and make it always possible to identify who is accountable for a decision.

UNESCO has already defined an ethical impact assessment tool and a readiness assessment methodology applied in more than seventy countries.[67, 68] The problem is not the lack of a method, but the difficulty of comparing results and linking them to technical tests on systems. The pillar integrates these tools into the test protocols of function 5.1 and ensures their comparability across countries and sectors, in liaison with UNESCO, which retains ownership. The task is not to write new principles: shared ones already exist, from the 2021 UNESCO Recommendation to the Rome Call for AI Ethics, promoted by the Pontifical Academy for Life and signed in Rome on 28 February 2020 by Microsoft, IBM, FAO and the Italian Government, which calls for "algorethics", ethics by design, and which was signed in Hiroshima on 10 July 2024 by representatives of eleven world religions.[101] The pillar translates them into verifiable criteria within tests, defined together with the scientific community, companies, civil society and the different cultural and religious traditions, not only with those who produce the models. These are not codes of conduct, but checks carried out within the tests, starting with human oversight. Since the United States will leave UNESCO on 31 December 2026, the function does not rest on a single organisation: it also draws on the OECD Principles, adopted by Washington, and on corporate commitments, from the Rome Call, whose first signatories include Microsoft and IBM, to the White House Accord, which entrusts the evaluation of frontier models to an independent external reviewer.[55, 107, 109] It also serves a second purpose, which emerged forcefully in September. Commitments to host external evaluators and the mutual verification proposed at the Security Council produce comparable results only if what is verified is defined in the same way.[19, 46, 48]

Human accountability is part of this function. All international instruments affirm the principle of human oversight; in New York it was repeated by the Secretary-General, the signatories of the call of 21 September, Altman and President Xi.[42, 43, 46, 53] But its implementation depends on technical answers: in which decisions human presence must be effective and not merely formal, what information the decision-maker must receive, how control is documented. Without these answers oversight becomes a box to be ticked, and the incidents of summer 2026 show that the chain breaks precisely where action is delegated to groups of agents.[44] The pillar includes in the protocols operational criteria that, in systems affecting rights or significant interests, make the accountable person identifiable: minimum information requirements, reasoned cases by sector, attribution criteria. It does not develop a new methodology, does not carry out evaluations on behalf of third parties, does not accredit evaluators, does not attribute liability in specific cases and does not replace national law. It is working if evaluations conducted with UNESCO tools become comparable, if a growing number of legal systems and companies use them and if, faced with an automated decision, it is possible to state quickly who is accountable for it.

Foundations. Magnifica Humanitas and Antiqua et nova: effects on the person are assessed before adoption and responsibility for the decision cannot be delegated. Borgo Egnazia address. Rome Call for AI Ethics (2020; Hiroshima, 2024). UNESCO: ethical impact assessment, human oversight and determination, responsibility. OECD AI Principles (2019, updated in 2024). White House Accord. The "evaluations ecosystem" of the AI Action Plan; proposals by Altman and Amodei. Liaison with UNESCO and OHCHR.[12, 14, 15, 23, 26, 46, 48, 55, 101, 109]

FUNCTION 5.3 DISTINCTIVE CORE · YEAR ONE

Evaluation expertise

Train evaluators and regulators in countries that do not have an institute of their own, starting with the Global South. Without expertise in public administrations, no method has any effect.

A regulator who does not understand the technology cannot apply any method; a citizen who does not know how it works cannot exercise their rights. Capacity building is one of the areas indicated by Resolution A/RES/79/325 for the work of the Global Dialogue.[58] In New York the United States said the same thing in other words: the United Nations should help countries build national capacity, because "you cannot govern technology you do not understand".[47] The pillar trains evaluators and regulators from countries that do not have an institute of their own, with a programme built on the protocols of function 5.1, including multilingual tests, and delivered with the United Nations System Staff College in Turin and the AI Hub in Rome. It disseminates literacy pathways adaptable to national contexts. It is the function with the best cost-to-result ratio and the one that can be launched most quickly, through existing university networks.[31, 73] It does not define school curricula, does not award qualifications and does not run infrastructure of its own. It is working if the number of trained evaluators and officials, and of administrations with in-house expertise, grows measurably.

Foundations. Magnifica Humanitas: discernment must be formed. Antiqua et nova: education in critical judgement. UNESCO: literacy, education and research. United States position at the Security Council.[12, 15, 47]

FUNCTION 5.4 DISTINCTIVE CORE · YEAR ONE

Technical support to the Panel and the Dialogue

Provide the Scientific Panel and the Global Dialogue with stable technical capacity, without decision-making roles.

The Panel and the Dialogue work with a secretariat shared among several offices and with limited resources, at a time when the UN80 Initiative is cutting posts across the whole system.[59, 76, 94] The pillar offers a technical support unit based in Milan, hosted by Italy and activated at the request of the Office for Digital and Emerging Technologies. The unit prepares technical papers, gathers comparable data and organises contributions to the work of the Dialogue and the Panel, and is funded by the host country. It has no role in scientific assessment, which remains with the Panel, nor in convening the Dialogue, which remains with the General Assembly. It is working if the Panel and the co-chairs of the Dialogue use it for their 2027 work. The United States voted against the appointments to the Panel, and for this reason the scope of the function remains purely technical; the other three functions are services to States that do not depend on the Panel, and the pillar remains useful even if the relationship with the Panel were to change.[105]

Foundations. A/RES/79/325 on Secretariat support and voluntary contributions. In-kind contributions by host countries, on the precedent of Spain.[58, 93]

5.5 NOT FUNCTIONS OF THE PILLAR

Liaison areas

In areas that belong to other organisations the pillar exercises no functions of its own. It offers its evaluation methods, at the request of the organisation holding the mandate, which retains competence.

The test against the Carolina Principles requires that existing mandates not be duplicated. For this reason important topics such as labour, health or the environment do not become tasks of the pillar: they remain with the organisations that hold the mandate, to which the pillar makes available test protocols, comparable measures and evaluation expertise, only when they request it.[2, 6]

Area	Mandate holder	What the pillar can offer, on request
Transparency and provenance of content	ISO, IEC, ITU	Methods for testing the robustness of watermarking techniques, without setting standards or managing registries[23]
Data and dataset documentation	ISO, IEC, ITU	Criteria for assessing the representativeness of data in test protocols
Gaps between countries	UNDP, ITU, UNESCO, UNCTAD	Comparable measures of evaluation capacity; no management of funds or compute[43, 47]
Labour	ILO	Methods for evaluating pilot projects and their effects on work; labour standards remain with the ILO[9, 49]
Health and minors	WHO, UNICEF	Test protocols for clinical uses and for systems aimed at minors; no health competence[40]
Environment and compute	UNEP, ITU	Comparable methods for measuring the footprint of data centres; no powers over facilities[22, 23]
Incidents and stability	OECD common framework	Link between incidents and function 5.1 tests; no new taxonomy and no national security competence[20, 44, 66]
Languages and culture	UNESCO, WIPO	Multilingual tests (5.1); intellectual property remains with WIPO

The area of incidents deserves a clarification, because in New York it was raised by all sides: the call of 21 September asks for the sharing of reports on serious incidents, Altman for rapid classification protocols and secure channels between governments, Amodei for a notification system, and Washington proposed a bilateral mechanism to Beijing.[43, 46, 48, 52] A common framework already exists: the OECD defined it in February 2025, with 29 criteria, and feeds it through the AIM monitor.[66] The pillar does not replicate it. It links incidents to the tests of function 5.1 and sends alerts to the Panel, and if States were to negotiate bilateral guarantees or common thresholds, it would provide the measurement basis on which to rest them. It does not take part in arms control negotiations, which remain in their own fora.

CHAPTER 06

What the pillar produces and how it is organised

> The four functions generate four types of product, which are also the criterion for measuring their usefulness: a function or line of work that produces none of them in a work cycle has no reason to be maintained.

Product	Content	Functions
Methods	Comparable test protocols, including in several languages, with integrated ethical tools and shared criteria for evaluation quality, which institutes, regulators and companies can use without each having to rebuild them	5.1, 5.2
Measures	Comparable indicators and time series of the capabilities of frontier systems; measures in the liaison areas, at the request of mandate holders	5.1, 5.5
Alerts	Timely alerts to the Scientific Panel on emerging capabilities, linked to incidents classified under the OECD common framework; technical papers for the Panel and the Dialogue	5.1, 5.4
Expertise	Training of evaluators and regulators in countries without an institute, literacy pathways	5.3

None of the four products is a rule and none entails compliance obligations. All of them, if adopted, reduce the cost of applying the rules that States have already chosen or will choose. For this reason the project is compatible with the Chapel Hill orientation and with the United States line, and at the same time responds to the demand for measurement and verification formulated in New York. Standards and convening remain with States and the General Assembly.

6.1 A lean architecture

The model is that of a new-generation pillar, different from the specialised agency of the last century. It has no mandate to coordinate the United Nations system and does not duplicate existing mandates. It has a small secretariat, capable of developing methods and measures, and a technical support unit serving the Scientific Panel and the Global Dialogue, activated at the request of the Office for Digital and Emerging Technologies and funded by Italy. It has intergovernmental governance, with structured participation of companies, the scientific community and civil society and a strict separation between those who fund and those who evaluate.[16, 57] What the United Nations needs is a technical capacity it does not have today, not another bureaucracy.

6.2 Funding

Resolution A/RES/79/325 provides that the Panel and the Dialogue be supported by the Secretariat within existing resources and encourages voluntary contributions.[58] Today the trust fund supporting the Secretariat receives contributions from, among others, Germany, Italy and Omidyar Network; Spain contributes in kind and Japan supports the Office for Digital and Emerging Technologies.[92, 93] In a system that, with UN80, is cutting posts and budget, the pillar does not ask for resources from the regular budget.[75, 76] Funding rests on three sources. The host country provides the premises, the technical support unit and a multi-year contribution. States contribute on a voluntary basis to the Secretariat of the Panel and

the Dialogue and to the pillar's lines of work. Companies take part through a fund governed by agreements, with caps on individual contributions and no voting rights on methods; their willingness remains to be verified, but the requests for common standards made by OpenAI and Anthropic at the Security Council point in this direction.[46, 48] Any recourse to assessed contributions from Member States would require, under the United Nations budget rules, a decision of the General Assembly. The condition of credibility is the separation between those who fund and those who evaluate. Contributions from companies confer no right to vote or veto, are public and are subject to limits preventing any single operator from weighing more than the others, in line with Altman's caution that standards must not favour incumbent operators.[46]

6.3 Liaison with the system

Each liaison area remains with the organisation that holds the mandate for the subject, which retains competence: the ILO for labour, WHO and UNICEF for health and minors, UNESCO for ethics, culture and education, UNDP, ITU and UNCTAD for development and gaps, ISO, IEC and ITU for technical standards, UNEP for the environment, the OECD for incidents, WIPO for intellectual property, OHCHR for human rights. The pillar liaises with the Valencia laboratory, with the international network of evaluation institutes, with the AI Hub in Rome and with the Global AI Hub of the Republic of Korea, for which Seoul signed a letter of intent with six United Nations agencies in March, presented on 21 May a shared vision with nine international organisations and five multilateral development banks, proposed to launch at the end of October the bidding procedure for sites, assessed on 19 indicators, with the final choice expected in December, and plans to open in 2027.[62, 65, 69, 70, 73, 97]

Outside the system, the pillar operates consistently with the Carolina Principles, with the White House Accord, with European Union law and the AI Office, with the Council of Europe Framework Convention and with the Dublin Declaration of 14 October 2026 on trustworthy, secure and sovereign artificial intelligence, without certifying conformity with any of these frameworks: its methods are neutral with respect to legal orders and serve voluntary commitments and binding rules alike.[17, 29, 30, 55, 74] The World AI Cooperation Organization, established in Shanghai on 16 July by 29 founding countries and grown to 37 members by the end of July, operates outside the United Nations perimeter; the President of Kazakhstan, Tokayev, has proposed hosting a regional office for Central Asia. The Milan pillar works within the United Nations and does not overlap with that body.[18, 71, 98]

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CHAPTER 07

The implementation sequence

> The four functions operate from the first year, because they do not require any new legal mandate. What develops over time is the extension of the methods to the liaison areas and their scale, so that each phase produces verifiable results before the next step is requested. The credibility of a new institution is built on the results of its first year.

Within twelve months, the four functions. They start as a joint initiative of volunteer States, existing agencies, companies and the scientific community, without presupposing new legal competences. The library of test protocols, including multilingual tests, and shared criteria for evaluation quality (5.1); the integration of UNESCO tools and human accountability criteria into the protocols (5.2); the programme for evaluators and regulators with UNSSC in Turin and the AI Hub in Rome (5.3); the technical support unit for the Panel and the Dialogue, operational before the New York session of May 2027 (5.4). In light of what emerged in New York, the pillar links its tests from the outset to the OECD common framework for incident reporting, which can serve as the technical basis for the notification mechanism discussed between the United States and China and for the sharing of reports requested by the call of 21 September.[43, 52, 66]

From twelve to thirty-six months, consolidation. The products acquire continuity and the methods are made available to the liaison areas, at the request of the mandate-holding organisations: protocols for clinical uses and for systems aimed at minors with WHO and UNICEF, evaluation of pilot projects and their effects on work with the ILO, capacity measures with UNDP and UNCTAD, environmental measurement methods with UNEP and ITU. The technical secretariat is consolidated and the relationship with the Panel and the Global Dialogue is stabilised.

Beyond thirty-six months, scale. The language coverage of the protocols, the number of countries reached by the training programme and the time series of capabilities all grow. At this point the sixth rule requires a review: lines of work that have not generated methods, measures, alerts or expertise are closed.

Date	Event	Relevance for the proposal
September 2026	High-level week of the 81st General Assembly and Security Council, New York	Call of 21 September; proposals on standards, verification and reporting
16 October 2026	Appointment of the co-chairs of the 2027 Dialogue, Saint Kitts and Nevis and Republic of Korea	Direct interlocutors for Milan's technical contribution
End of October 2026	Leaders' meeting on the follow-up to the call; Austria proposes Vienna for a UN AI centre	First government bid in Europe; makes an act by the Italian Government urgent
9 November 2026	Launch of the Promoting Committee at Palazzo Turati, Milan	Start of the collection of parliamentary groups' signatures for the motion in the Senate
18 and 20 November 2026	Motions supporting the bid tabled in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate	Parliamentary mandate to the Government
19 November 2026	First informal consultations on the 2027 Dialogue; the EU names "testing and evaluation" among the priorities	European demand consistent with functions 5.1 and 5.3

December 2026	Start of the United Kingdom's G20 Presidency	Agenda on global principles and standards for AI
14–15 December 2026	G20 Leaders' Summit, Miami[17, 91]	Political follow-up to the Carolina Principles
By December 2026	Choice of the site of the Korean Global AI Hub	Liaison for training and development
1 January 2027	New Secretary-General takes office; United States G7 Presidency, venue and dates to be confirmed[91]	Handover on the AI dossier
3–4 May 2027	Second session of the Global Dialogue, New York	Natural venue to present the proposed functions, in the areas of system safety and capacity building
2027	Report of the Scientific Panel	Evidence base for 5.1 and 5.4
From September 2027	Review of the Global Digital Compact and 82nd General Assembly	Decisive window for the pillar
27–28 November 2027	G20 Leaders' Summit, Manchester, towards the "Manchester Compact on AI"[54, 116]	Global principles and standards, and measurement

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CHAPTER 08

What it means for Italy and for Milan

> Moving from the reasons for the seat to the content of the functions has practical consequences for those supporting the bid. The reasons for the seat are set out in chapter 1; here we indicate what follows in terms of action.

Support already secured. On 12 October 2026, at the General Assembly of Assolombarda at the Teatro Dal Verme, AmCham Italy, Assolombarda and Confcommercio Milano Lodi Monza Brianza signed the public Manifesto, then entitled “Milan, global capital of the governance of artificial intelligence”, through Simone Crolla, Alvise Biffi and Carlo Sangalli.[80] On the same occasion Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni stated: “we can only look with great interest at all initiatives moving in this direction, all the more so if they originate in Milan, which can rightly be considered Italy’s AI hub”.[79] On 9 November, at the launch of the Promoting Committee at Palazzo Turati, the proposal received the full support of the President of the Senate, Ignazio La Russa, and of Undersecretary Alessio Butti. President La Russa asked Senator Sandro Sisler to collect the signatures of all parliamentary groups and undertook, once they have been collected, to ask for the motion to be placed on the agenda of the Conference of Group Leaders “as soon as possible”.[82, 103] Undersecretary Butti acknowledged that “Milan has the expertise and experience to put forward this bid” and assured the Government’s support for the project.[82, 104]

A dossier of functions, not only of credentials. The host-city proposal now in preparation should adopt the four functions as its backbone, devoting to each a fact sheet with the instruments, the Milanese and national scientific partners that could be involved and the expected indicators, and indicating for each liaison area the mandate-holding organisation with which to work. This is how a bid presents itself as a project and not as a real-estate offer.

An urban laboratory already at work. Some functions find an existing testing ground in Milan. The municipal Manifesto, the mapping of use cases in city services, the urban digital twin and the programmes on human-centred solutions provide a real test bed for evaluation methods, for ethics and rights in evaluation and for training (5.1, 5.2 and 5.3).[16, 32]

A coalition to be turned into technical content. Since the publication of the first paper the base of support has widened: local institutions, universities and research centres, companies and their associations, professional bodies, the financial system and parliamentarians of different political orientations. The task for the coming months is to translate this consensus into technical work, entrusting mixed groups with drafting the function fact sheets.[16, 82]

A bridging role after New York. The General Assembly week showed an international community divided on the instrument, not on the need. Italy, which has excellent relations with Washington and sits in the Council of the European Union, has room to propose a solution that both sides can accept: a seat that provides methods and measures without regulatory powers, consistent with the American request to build national capacity and with the signatories’ request for measurement and verification. The call remains open for endorsement, and an Italian signature that shares its demand for measurement and verification, rather than for new regulatory powers, accompanied by Milan’s proposal, would be a positive signal. It is a position that Italy, an ally of the United States and a trusted seat with methods open to all, can uphold with credibility.

Three Government acts in six months. Endorse the call by Finland and Norway, which Italy has not yet signed, sharing its demand for measurement and verification rather than for new regulatory powers.[43] Write to the new Secretary-General, who takes office on 1 January 2027, to offer Milan as the seat of the pillar. Offer to co-lead, at the session of the Global Dialogue in May 2027, the work on evaluation, system safety and capacity building.[57] None of the three acts requires new structures. They are made credible by direction

from the Coordination Committee provided for by Article 19 of Law no. 132 of 2025, chaired by the President of the Council of Ministers or the delegated political authority, embedded in the National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence and supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in New York, and by a national evaluation capacity built with AgID, ACN and the universities, with Italy joining the international network of evaluation institutes.[28, 65, 72] Before the proposal is formalised, informal consultation with Washington and with NIST would allow it to be presented as a contribution to measurement science and not as a new venue for rules. In due course, the offer of premises and a technical support unit in Milan and a voluntary contribution to the Secretariat of the Panel and the Dialogue will complete the commitment.[58, 92]

Parliament. A bipartisan motion committing the Government to support Milan's proposal, tabled in the Chamber of Deputies on 18 November and in the Senate by Senator Sisler on 20 November, after the collection of signatures launched on 9 November.[82, 103] In the European Parliament a motion for a resolution supporting European bids is being prepared. A hearing of the promoters before the Foreign Affairs Committees and the committees responsible for innovation in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. No figures today: resources will come in due course, once the bid has taken shape in multilateral fora.

The European Parliament and the Union. A question to the Commission and the High Representative on European support for an agreed seat, a discussion in the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs, liaison with the AI Office. The Dublin Declaration, signed on 14 October by 26 States including Italy, is a political commitment that names no seats and leaves room for a European bid.[74] At United Nations level, dialogue with the co-chairs of the 2027 Dialogue, with the Office for Digital and Emerging Technologies and with the leaders of the regional groups, building on Italy's role as the third host country of the system.[31, 59]

Precedents. Italy has already secured seats of this kind. In 2023 Milan became the seat of a section of the Unified Patent Court; Rome hosts the AI Hub for Sustainable Development and is preparing to host the headquarters functions of UNCDF. In Europe, in 2024 Frankfurt won the EU Anti-Money Laundering Authority after an open competition, and in March 2026 Lille was designated as the seat of the new EU Customs Authority, at the end of a selection among nine candidate cities, including Rome. These are bids won with a project, Government direction and broad parliamentary support; the customs case is a reminder that without these elements even a good Italian bid may not prevail.[73, 77, 78, 95]

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Conclusion

> The first paper explained why Milan. This second paper explains what Milan could host: four functions ordered by a single criterion, operational from the first year, four verifiable products, a declared liaison with the organisations that hold the mandate in other areas, an explicit limit on what the pillar does not do, a lean structure and funding that does not weigh on the regular budget of the United Nations.

The New York week made the proposal more timely. The President of the United States rejected any global scheme of control; the Secretary-General and the leaders of the call, who by 30 October numbered 34 signatories from 32 countries, asked for standards, verification and independent oversight; the heads of OpenAI and Anthropic asked the Security Council for common measurement methods and rapid reporting channels. These requests start from different premises, but they find an answer in the same seat: a place that does not regulate, but makes it possible to know, measure, give timely alerts and train those who have to decide.

The proposal, therefore, does not ask the international community to regulate more. It asks it to know better. For this reason it is not in conflict with those who, like the United States, ask that innovation not be held back: the evaluations ecosystem that the American strategy itself sets out to build needs measurements that are comparable beyond national borders.[23] Nor is it in conflict with those who ask for more control, because no control is possible without shared methods and measures.

Milan can offer that place, together with an industrial, scientific, university and healthcare system in which the four functions and the liaison areas find real interlocutors. Italy can offer its experience as a host country and the credibility of having already brought the issue to the tables of the G7 and the United Nations. Europe can offer a trusted seat, allied with the United States and open to all, in which “technology at the service of the person” is a shared principle. Italy’s task, in the coming months, is to come to the multilateral tables not with a request, but with a project.

It is not one more agency. It is the home in which independent evaluation becomes the common heritage of all States. For Italy it can be, at once, a priority and a flagship.

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Methodological note

> The institutional facts referred to are verified against primary sources or news agencies and updated to 25 November 2026. This edition incorporates the organisation of the pillar into four functions, already adopted in the Manifesto, takes account of the position of the United States on the international governance of artificial intelligence, and includes the checks carried out in October and November on the United Nations architecture, on existing technical seats, on endorsements of the call of 21 September and its follow-up, including the Austrian proposal for Vienna, on the positions expressed in November by the European Union, Italy and the United Kingdom, on the parliamentary motions, on the 2027 calendar and on institutional support for the bid; dates not yet official are indicated as to be confirmed.

Quotations from statements delivered in English are given in their original wording where it could be verified against the published text or the news agency reports cited in the notes; in the other cases, and for statements delivered in Italian or French, the wording is a translation by AmCham Italy. The four functions, the liaison areas, the rules of method, the exclusions, the classification of products, the implementation sequence and the correspondence between the requests that emerged in New York and the proposed functions are AmCham Italy's own elaboration and do not reflect the positions of the organisations, governments or persons cited. Quotations from the Magisterium indicate the ethical anchoring of the criteria adopted and do not imply the endorsement by the Holy See of any specific institutional architecture or of Milan's bid. No formal United Nations procedure is known to have been launched for the establishment of a new pillar or a new specialised agency on artificial intelligence, or for the selection of its seat.

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